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especially since the advent of democratic government in 2000. The thesis concludes with 
an assessment of the contributions of international organizations and bi-lateral aid, as 
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Table 1.   Croatian Pronunciation Guide 
 
Unique Croatian Letter Guide 
Croatian Letter Phonetic Pronunciation 
C ts ts in cats 
Č ch ch in cheese 
Ć tch tch in ketchup 
Dž j j in jeep 
Đ  (đ) dj dg in dodge 
J y y in yes 
Lj l'(y) li in million 
Nj n'(y) ny in canyon 
Š sh sh in ship 






















 I. INTRODUCTION 
Croatia seeks to put the violence and bloodshed in the Balkans of the 1990s 
behind it and join the rest of Europe.  The desire to move toward the west has its roots in 
a Croatian cultural tradition that sees Croatia as an integral part of the west, as well as 
rejecting the 20th century legacy of South Slav Communism.  Croatia has historic ties to 
Catholic Europe through the influence of Italy in Istria and the Dalmatian coast1 and the 
ties to Austria and Hungary, which go back to the 11th century.  Croatians see 
Catholicism as a vital part of “the West” and, in the tradition of the Habsburgs, contrasted 
that with the Orthodox and Islamic faiths practiced in Bosnia and Serbia, which they 
regard as “Asiatic.”  This impression was reinforced by Pope Leo X reference to Croatia 
as the “Bulwark of Christendom” in 1519.2  Today, Croatia looks to its future with a 
desire for freedom, democracy and free market capitalism.  
A portion of Croatia’s desire to set its own path and distance itself from the 
“Balkans” can be attributed to a fear of domination by Serbia, which has happened in the 
confederations of the South Slavs of 1919, 1945 and 1989.  This fear, and the frustration 
of opponents, was made clear in 1918 when Stjepan Radić stated that Croatia was rushing 
headlong into joining the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes “like drunken geese in 
the fog.”3  Now after the 20th century, Croatia advances toward what it sees as a historic 
return to Europe.  This policy is the final piece of the “Thousand Year Dream” of 
Croatian independence because that it will be peaceful and stable.4 
All of these political and cultural issues increase Croatia’s desire to be a part of 
Euro-Atlantic organizations.  The North Atlantic Alliance signifies the most important 
organization to join due to the security assurances of membership.  The second chapter 
                                                 
1 Figure 1 displays the regions of Croatia. 
2 The link with Hungary goes back to 1097 when the Hungarians defeated Croatia in battle and the 
Hungarian King coopted the Croatians by offering them virtual self-government under a Ban in exchange 
for recognizing him as king in a Croatian-Hungarian union.  Croatia’s link with Italy can be traced to the 
12th century battles over the Dalmatian Coast and Istria between the Kingdom of Venice and alternately, the 
Turks and the Hungarians.  Marcus Tanner, Croatia:  A Nation forged in War, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1997.  14, 18, 32. 
3 Ibid,   119-120. 
4 Ibid,   275-298. 
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 explores the enlargement of the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO) since its very 
inception.  The process of enlargement, the arguments for and against the idea and the 
implications of such enlargement are examined. 
The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s brought about new perils and 
opportunities.  The countries of eastern and central Europe sought to join NATO to 
signify the end of a divided continent and the beginning of a unified and free Europe.  
The leadership of NATO stated that its door would remain open to new members and to 
prove the viability of that statement, they created the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) in 
1994 and the Membership Action Program (MAP) in 1999.  These programs were 
established to assist countries in making progress in the military and political reform that 
could lead to membership.  The chapter concludes by reviewing the status of Croatia’s 
quest for membership. 
The third chapter discusses the evolution of the Croatian military and the impact 
of the 20th century.  The rise of the Ustaše in Croatia during the Second World War 
brought disaster and an ambiguous legacy after 1945.  The Ustaše was a fascist, Quisling 
regime and Axis ally that militarized Croatian society and used the military and militias 
to conduct an ethnic cleansing campaign.  Their policies and the upheaval of the times 
brought them into conflict with other elements in Yugoslavia’s civil war. 
The communist Partisan movement, led by Josip Broz Tito, emerged from the 
civil war victorious.  Tito created the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) to be a multi-ethnic 
force that would defend the integrity and sovereignty of the Socialist Federative Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY).  The JNA saw itself as the guarantor of the Yugoslav state.  It 
became a powerful political actor within the SFRY and had a great deal of access to Tito 
who provided well for the JNA. 
Tito’s death in 1980 was a watershed moment for the JNA and Yugoslavia.  The 
most successful of the federal republics renewed their push for independence and the 
JNA perceived that its raison d’etre was being destroyed by the secession of Slovenia and 
Croatia.  This further politicized the JNA that had become, over the years, dominated by 
Serbs.  The war in 1991 found Croatia ill-prepared to defend itself.  An immediate 
program to develop its armed forces ensued.  This program was combined with a reliance 
2
 on paramilitary organizations that have a long history in the Balkans and Croatia in 
particular.  Reliance on paramilitaries, the creation of the armed forces on the foundation 
of special police and territorial defense units and a covert weapons procurement program 
all created an environment which overturned any parliamentary oversight.  Fighting the 
war against the Serbs further cemented this executive and political party control of the 
military without any movement toward democratic control. 
The fourth chapter takes on the issues of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in 
Croatia.  The period of independence is divided into three phases.  The first is the war 
years of 1991-1995, second is the period of authoritarian consolidation from 1995-2000, 
and last is the democratization from 2000 to the present.  These three eras of SSR are 
analyzed from the perspectives of political, institutional, economic and societal 
dimensions. 
The international community has played a significant role in Croatian SSR.  
Defense assistance from western countries has provided invaluable resources and 
expertise in bringing SSR.  The role of NATO as a donor organization and the aggressive 
work by Croatia to be fully involved in PfP exercises and other initiatives haves had a 
tremendously positive influence.  Countries and international organizations have used 
conditionality to help push Croatia toward reform, specifically with regard to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and defense reform. 
The future for Croatian SSR is based on an expansion of civilian defense 
expertise and the capacity for creating that expertise.  This expertise will provide the type 
of local ownership over the security sector that will allow a self-policing security sector 
of educated civilians within the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the Sabor 
(parliament), in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and in the media.  All of these, 
in combination, will provide the checks and balances necessary to give true democratic 
oversight. 
Membership in NATO is ultimately a political decision and the decision on 
Croatia’s bid for membership will be made on political terms.  The ability of Croatia to 
make major strides in SSR, as it has done and is doing, will give it a much stronger case 
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 II. CROATIA’S PROSPECTS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Croatia is seeking membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.  The road to this 
goal has been influenced by the process of NATO enlargement and national history.  This 
chapter will examine the influence that these developments may exert upon Croatia’s 
NATO membership.  The first section will briefly outline the basis for NATO 
enlargement, including Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the 1991 Strategic 
Concept from the Rome Summit.  The section will continue by examining the changes 
that came with the 1994 Brussels Summit and the 1995 “Study on NATO Enlargement” 
and that led to the landmark invitation of three new members at the 1997 Madrid Summit.  
Acceptance of those members at the 1999 Washington Summit and creation of the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the invitation of seven more potential members at 
the 2002 Prague Summit will be reviewed. 
The second section will discuss the debate within the Alliance for and against 
enlargement.  These arguments covered topics ranging from the role of the Alliance to 
speed the transitions to democracy and free markets for aspiring countries to the 
imperative of maintaining a credible military alliance capable of collective defense.  This 
section outlines the arguments for and against and their relevance to Croatia’s case. 
Next, the chapter will examine Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the MAP.  While 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) of 1991 began the dialogue with the 
countries of Eastern Europe, the creation of PfP in 1994 was the first concrete step 
toward making the “Open Door” a reality for countries that wished to join NATO.  The 
experience of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic showed that PfP heretofore alone 
was not enough to properly prepare a potential new member for the requirements of the 
Alliance based on the experience of 1995-1999.  Thus, in 1999, the Membership Action 
Plan was established to provide the “advice, assistance and practical support” necessary 
for taking positive steps on all aspects of NATO membership.1  These programs are 
complementary and important for an aspiring member. 
                                                 
1 NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 2001,  65 
5
 The 1997 Madrid Summit and the 2002 Prague Summit invited a total of ten 
countries to join the Alliance.  This section will review the relative merits, political and 
military, of each of the invited countries.  While the enlargement process is highly 
political and the stated goals are “soft”-- in the sense that exact budget figures and 
military expenditures will not answer the question of whether a country has made the 
necessary improvements for membership – it will be instructive to look at the state of 
these countries at the time of their invitation to later compare them with Croatia. 
Finally, the largest section will examine Croatia’s fate in the process of NATO 
enlargement.  First it will look at the late start toward NATO that Croatia made, in large 
part due to decisions made by President Franjo Tuđman from 1991-1995 and the focus on 
the Homeland War.  The additional requirements levied on Croatia as a part of the 
Dayton Peace Accords were a further impediment toward partnership and the MAP.  
Croatia was responsible for the implementation of the accords on behalf of the Bosnian 
Croats.  Therefore, Croatia was tasked with its own political and military reform effort 
and a portion of the reform and implementation in Bosnia-Hecegovina, tasks with which 
other countries desiring NATO membership were not burdened.2  Croatia did not join PfP 
until May 2000 and didn’t become a part of MAP until 2002.  The timeline for meeting 
the stated criteria for membership, the benefits and liabilities of membership for Croatia 
and NATO, and the domestic and international obstacles to joining the Alliance will be 
examined.  Based on the invitations made at the Prague Summit, a comparison will be 
made of relative political, military and economic strengths of the countries in comparison 
to Croatia.  Next, the arguments for and against enlargement will be viewed through the 
lens of potential Croatian membership.  Finally, in an August 2002 memorandum, NATO 
Secretary General Robertson informed Croatian President Mesić that Croatia needed to 
implement a series of reforms to be considered for admission.3  The issues that 
Robertson brought up are the basic requirements of NATO for new member states and 
the conclusion will try to outline the steps Croatia must take. 
                                                  
2 Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton:  The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy.  Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000.   180-189. 
3 “NATO Chief tell Croatia’s Mesić ‘Series of Reforms Needed for Membership,” Zagreb Hina, 7 Aug 
2002 
6
 B. THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
The idea of enlargement for the North Atlantic Alliance goes back to its earliest 
days as the original members ensured the possibility for future expansion.4  The 1949 
North Atlantic Treaty allows for the invitation of new European states in Article 10, 
which states: 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European 
State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute 
to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treat.  Any State 
so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument 
of accession with the Government of the United States of America.  The 
Government of the United States of America will inform each of the 
Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.5 
Since that time, fourteen countries have joined or have been invited to join the 
original twelve members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States).  The additional members and their year of accession are Greece and Turkey 
(1952), West Germany (1955), Spain (1982), and the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland (1999).  Seven more countries were invited to join the Alliance at the 2002 Prague 
Summit.  Those countries are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia.   
Each expansion of NATO has encountered resistance from members who have 
identified various concerns against expansion.  Even the movement from the Dunkerque 
and Brussels treaties to the Washington Treaty brought resistance from the Western 
Union members.  They did not want to admit Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway or 
Portugal for fear of diluting the U.S. military aid provided to members, but the United 
States insisted that these states become members.  Similar dynamics have occurred with 
each addition to the Alliance.6  
                                                 
4 In fact, the North Atlantic Alliance is itself an outgrowth of a movement from 1947-1949 that saw 
the creation of the Western Union (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and United Kingdom) 
through the Dunkerque and Brussels Treaties and later talks which included the United States and Canada 
and led to the Washington Treaty of 1949. 
5 North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 1949, Article 10 
6 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement:  NATO’s First Fifty Years, Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1999.   5, 31. 
7
 The 1991 Rome Summit ushered in a number of new ideas for NATO.  With the 
end of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, an entirely new outlook for dealing with the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe emerged.  These ideas included the creation of 
the NACC to open dialogue between NATO and these countries.  NATO’s New Strategic 
Concept emphasized the new opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between NATO 
countries and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.7  The attitude that 
Europe and North America could move forward into a relationship of trust and support 
for the ideas of liberal society was clear in the Rome declaration: 
The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a 
community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law.  As an agent of change, a source of stability and the 
indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will 
continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in 
Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.8 
The declaration identified the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe9 as the 
primary venue in which all nations of Europe and North America would be able to 
discuss security issues in Europe.  The cooperation groundwork was being laid that 
would lead to further enlargement of the Alliance. 
At the 1994 Brussels Summit, the North Atlantic Council publicly confirmed its 
willingness to expand NATO.   
We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the 
Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states 
in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO 
expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an 
evolutionary process, taking into account political and security 
developments in the whole of Europe.10    
The meeting in Brussels also saw the creation of PfP, which will be covered later. 
As NATO moved step by step toward enlargement, it conducted a “Study on 
                                                 
7 North Atlantic Council, New Strategic Concept, paragraphs 28-29, 8 Nov 1991 
8 North Atlantic Council, Rome Declaration, paragraph 2, 8 Nov 1991 
9 This later came to be known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
10 North Atlantic Council, Brussels Declaration, paragraph 12, 11 Jan 1994 
8
 NATO Enlargement” presented in 1995.  This study identified seven rationales for 
enlargement: 
1) Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and 
democratic control; 
2) Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of 
cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations 
among current Allies; 
3) Promoting good-neighborly relations, which would benefit all countries in 
the Euro-Atlantic area, both member and non-members of NATO; 
4) Emphasizing common defense and extending its benefits and increasing 
transparency in defense planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national 
approach to defense policies. 
5) Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe 
based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing 
tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines; 
6) Strengthening the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and 
international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the 
responsibility to the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the 
UN Security Council as well as other new missions; [and] 
7) Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership.11 
These rationales are the basis for the programs that NATO has established to keep 
its door open, namely the Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action Plan. 
The 1997 Madrid Summit brought invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland to begin talks with NATO about membership.   And just prior to the 1999 
Washington Summit, those three countries were officially made Alliance members, and 
to ensure that the door remained open for other countries the MAP was created.12  There 
was a great deal of speculation about how another round of enlargement would proceed, 
with the extremes being the zero option or the “Big Bang.”  It turned out to be more like 
the latter than the former as at the 2002 Prague Summit, seven countries were invited to 
become members. 
                                                 
11 The numbering is the author’s.  North Atlantic Council, Study on NATO Enlargement, Brussels, 3 
Sep 1995, paragraph 3.  
12 These three countries officially became members on 12 March 1999 in a ceremony at the Truman 
Library in Independence, Missouri. 
9
 C. ARGUMENTS FOR ENLARGEMENT 
The arguments in favor of expansion of the Alliance run from a desire to promote 
democratization, free market prosperity, and constructive solutions to border and 
minority issues to a fear of a resurgent Russia to a desire to prevent competition amongst 
European powers to a desire to prevent another division of Europe.  The first argument 
was the public position of the Clinton Administration in its support of NATO 
enlargement, putting the best face on the issues without wanting to provoke Russia.   
The second argument, in many forms, dealt with the potential risk of Russian neo-
imperialism and the continued need for NATO to remain to counterbalance it.  To 
prevent that threat from disrupting democratic trends in Eastern Europe or beginning 
another European war, the protection of NATO must be extended.  Senator Jesse Helms 
argued that “A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against 
the possible return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear missiles and 
ambitions of restoring its lost empire.”13 
The call for expansion can also be argued from the standpoint of preventing the 
resurgence of “Great Power competition” between Russia, Germany, Britain and France.  
This has been the history of the continent and without a framework to assure peace, these 
countries might turn to the ideas of their past to gain prominence.  Former Director of the 
National Security Agency, General William Odom, US Army retired, was an advocate 
for this position, stating that “Central Europe will again become the scene of some, if not 
all, of the perverse dynamics of the interwar period unless NATO enlarges to preempt 
them.”14  In general terms, the argument is that if a power vacuum exists, it will be filled 
in and the best way to fill that vacuum is with NATO. 
Another argument in favor of enlargement is the desire to prevent the creation of 
competing alliance blocks.  If the countries of Eastern and Central Europe are left in a 
security void, they will do what they did in 1919 that is; negotiate mutual defense treaties 
to defend themselves against each other.  British expert Jonathan Eyal stated clearly the 
German fear of regional alliances in central Europe in this statement:   
                                                 
13 Yost,  108-109 
14 Ibid,   109 
10
 The security void which had been created in the heart of the continent 
would ultimately have to be filled by someone…Bereft of any serious 
institutional affiliation, the countries of the region would begin to 
construct their own security arrangements.  What would these 
arrangements have looked like?  Very much like the ones which had 
already plunged Europe into two world wars this century:  Poland and 
Romania…against Russia, Slovakia and Romania against Hungary, and 
the Czechs with the Poles in order to deflect Germany’s influence.  Had 
that happened, Germany would have then been faced with the option of 
either participating in central Europe’s local alliances or reaching a deal 
with Moscow in order to keep the region under control—precisely the 
choices which previous generations of German politicians faced, with such 
disastrous consequences.  For Bonn, therefore, the only solution was to 
work for the integration of these countries into both NATO and the 
European Union…”15 
The history of Europe suggests that these competing alliance blocks are 
destabilizing and will lead to war.  This situation can be avoided by bringing these 
countries into a large multi-lateral alliance such as NATO that ensures the security of 
Europe.   
D. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENLARGEMENT 
From 1991 to 1999, there were many arguments against enlargement of the 
Alliance.  They varied from sides of the Atlantic and political beliefs.  The effect of the 
“Big Bang” at the Prague Summit, however, has effectively muted those arguments.  And 
the “Big Bang” was made possible due to the change in security environment and the 
identification of threats after the attacks of 11 September 2001.  The United States and 
other Alliance members saw the need to bring Eastern European countries into the fold to 
enlist their support in helping defeat global terrorism and also to help prevent the 
conditions that might lead to terrorist cells operating in those countries. 
The first argument against enlargement was the fear that expansion of NATO 
would weaken it to the point of paralysis.  This fear is based on critics of the consensus 
style of decision-making within the Alliance.  When consensus is the standard, the 
increased number of members and the more varied points of view seem to make gaining 
the consensus necessary for the Alliance to act in any situation more difficult.  This need 
for consensus has brought about the charge that there will be a dilution of Alliance 
                                                 
15 Ibid.  111 
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 cohesion and effectiveness.16   
The second argument against enlargement is that the wrong criteria are being 
used.  These critics of the Clinton administration in 1995 believed that the primary 
requirement should be a country’s ability to make a positive contribution to the defense 
of NATO.  If they are unable to do that, the criteria of democratization and civilian 
control of the armed forces don’t mean very much.  This continues to be an issue within 
the debate.  The belief that the new members or candidates for membership lack the 
requisite skills of effective armed forces and, instead of contributing, they detract 
militarily from the Alliance.17  
The question of the credibility of Article 5 comes up as the Alliance expands.  
“Are the West Europeans prepared to make Article 5 commitments only because the 
putative Russian threat is now minimal, and because the United States is seen in both 
Eastern and Western Europe as the ultimate guarantor of the Alliance’s collective defense 
pledges?”18   If Article 5 defense of the Alliance is not credible, the Alliance will 
ultimately fall apart or morph into strictly a political entity akin to the United Nations, 
with a minimal defense role.  Either one of these developments would serve neither old 
nor new Alliance members who have come to rely on NATO as the security guarantor in 
Europe.  A role change for the alliance due to lack of credibility would leave the security 
void that was mentioned in the earlier arguments. 
Another argument against enlargement has been the fear that the United States is 
trying to use an expanded NATO as a vehicle for asserting its domination of Europe.  
This is a view often expressed by the French.  To many of them  
NATO enlargement signifies, in the worlds of Paul-Marie de la Gorce, ‘an 
extension of the zone that it [America] wanted to protect and ensure 
ssion of ‘the hegemonic will of the United States control over,’ an expre
                                                 
16 Yost,  106.  Mary H. Cooper, “Is the Alliance still Viable?” CQ Researcher, 28 Feb 2003, 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2003022801&type=toc&num=4& (accessed 5 May 
2003). Ronald Asmus and Charles Grant, “Debate:  Can NATO remain an effective military and political 
alliance if it keeps growing?” NATO Review,  Spring 2002.  Elke Krahmann, Terry Terriff and Mark 
Webber, “Who’s Next?: The Ongoing Story of NATO Enlargement,” ESRC ‘One Europe or Several?’ 
Programme,  2. 
17 Ronald Asmus and Charles Grant, “Debate:  Can NATO remain an effective military and political 
alliance if it keeps growing?” NATO Review, Spring 2002. 
18 Yost,   130 
12
 over the Old Continent.’  President Francois Mitterrand evidently 
interpreted U.S. interest in enlargement as an attempt by the United States 
‘to extend its influence in Eastern Europe, at low cost and to the detriment 
of the countries of Western Europe, which, moreover, are bearing the 
burden of most of the economic aid to these countries.’19 
This argument is still one that has been used by critics who fear U.S. hegemony in 
any international forum.  In an analogous situation, the United Nations’ debate over war 
in Iraq in 2002-2003 has been described as a truly being about the role of the United 
States in the world and what countries will be able to wield influence to stop a hegemonic 
power. 
The invitation to join the Alliance extended to seven countries in November 2002 
demonstrates that the arguments against enlargement have lost.  The questions then 
become what countries will be invited to join and when.  The answer to those questions 
will help shape the future of Europe.  The “New Europe” of an expanded North Atlantic 
Alliance and European Union will not have the same centers of power and influence as 
the “Old Europe” dominated by France, Germany and the United Kingdom.  The terrorist 
attacks since September 11th 2001 have refocused the issue of collective security on a 
different enemy, one that all the countries of the Alliance will have to address together.  
The knowledge that the United States holds the keys to acceptance in NATO makes it 
very important for any country that wants to be seriously considered for membership to 
curry favor with the United States.  That will, in the short term at least, bring about a 
block of Central and Eastern European countries that within Alliance politics align 
closely with the United States. Thus the emerging Europe will continue to maintain vital 
links to the United States. 
E. IMPLICATIONS 
There are four key implications for NATO enlargement.  First is the potential 
impact on cohesion of the Alliance.  Next are the implications for the “wanna be’s” who 
are not included.  Third is the risk of an unnecessary confrontation with Russia.  And 
finally, there is the issue of taking aboard new collective defense obligations. 
The potential impact on NATO cohesion is important.  NATO is a consensus 
uires unanimous agreement to be able to act in a situation.  organization and therefore req                                                 
19 Ibid,   113-114 
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 An Alliance that was a balancing act with 16 members has already expanded to 19 
members and with the invitations from the 2002 Summit, it will grow to 26 members.  It 
may be quite difficult to gain the support necessary to act as an alliance, even perhaps for 
collective defense.  Viewing the positions taken in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
during the debate in early 2003 to defend Turkey against possible Iraqi attack, one could 
draw the conclusion that France is the sole problem and thus moving the debate to the 
Defense Planning Committee will solve contentious issues.  It is more likely however, 
that any member might use similar tactics and since no other members have voluntarily 
absented themselves from the integrated military structure, that member could effectively 
block such an Alliance measure.20  That argument flies in the face of the history of 
consensus within the Alliance, even in the decision reached above.  The strong incentives 
to maintain the consensus approach to decision-making will continue to lead countries to 
compromise within NATO.  If there comes a time when consensus is unable to be 
reached, it may force the Alliance to look toward other methods for decision-making but 
it doesn’t seem likely. 
The second question concerns the fate of nations that are pursuing membership, 
but have not been accepted.  There is a fear that countries might feel they are 
permanently excluded from the Alliance and move away from the democratic gains that 
brought them to desire membership in the first place.  This fear has been well addressed 
by members of the Alliance that have repeatedly assured aspiring countries that there is 
and will remain an “Open Door” for further membership.  Secretaries of State 
Christopher and Albright continually hit upon this theme and the invitation of 10 
countries within 5 years certainly confirms this policy.  The Prague Declaration stated as 
well that the door will remain open to other countries.21  President George W. Bush said 
this of further enlargement: 
                                                 
20 In fact, Belgium and Germany also delayed the process of considering the measure in the NAC but 
both countries came to support the position during deliberations in the DPC.  NATO Secretary General 
Robertson has argued that the Alliance moved relatively quickly to resolve the issue and was able to do so 
with consensus of the DPC.  He further stated that NATO retains the political will to use military force 
when necessary as demonstrated by actions in the Balkans, anti-terrorist operations in the Mediterranean, 
the deployment of AWACS aircraft, anti-missile systems and chem.-bio defense units to Turkey.  The last 
issue of defense of Turkey could be agreed to after only 11 days.  This shows the ability to gain consensus 
despite difficult circumstances.  Remarks by Lord Robertson to the U.S. Atlantic Council, Washington 
D.C. 5 May 2003. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030505b.htm (accessed 5 May 2003). 
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 Because America supports a more united Europe, we strongly support the 
enlargement of NATO, now and in the future. Every European democracy 
that seeks NATO membership and is ready to share in NATO's 
responsibilities should be welcome in our Alliance. The enlargement of 
NATO is good for all who join us. The standards for membership are high, 
and they encourage the hard work of political and economic and military 
reform.22   
In other words, the door remains open for countries that are currently left out. 
Croatia falls into the category of “not yet” along with Albania and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  These three countries have pledged closer 
cooperation to work toward membership for each.23 
The third implication is that NATO may be tempting confrontation with Russia.  
Russia may believe that it is being isolated from Europe as the countries to its west 
become Alliance members and the Alliance moves east.  This can be seen as redrawing 
the division in Europe, only this time it is much closer to Russia’s borders and the 
Alliance has become larger and more powerful.  In Russian eyes, this larger Alliance is a 
destabilizing force.  Further, the primacy of NATO for European security in western 
European minds means that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) in not the central security forum.  The Russians see this as a threat because they 
have a voice within OSCE but they could only watch as NATO considered issues of 
European security.24  The Alliance took measures to provide the Russians some 
confidence in the non-threatening nature of NATO enlargement by trying to foster a 
special relationship with Russia, in part by creating first the Permanent Joint Council in 
1997 and then the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 to discuss issues and avoid conflict.  
Another major factor that has allowed for greater expansion is the post-September 11th 
environment and the willingness of Russian President Putin to allow the accession of a 
number of countries that had previously been the subject of bitter debate (the Baltic 
republics).  The evidence of the Prague Summit is that Russia will not act as a barrier to 
                                                 
22 George W. Bush speech to Atlantic Student Summit, Prague, 20 Nov 2002 
23 Jolyon Naegele, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “NATO: Albania, Croatia, Macedonia Pledge 
Closer Cooperation”, 22 Nov 2002 http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/11/22112002173508.asp (accessed 
3/5/2003) 
24 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years, Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1999,  198. 
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 enlargement, at least not to the membership of the seven current invited countries or the 
remaining three applicant countries. 
The fourth implication is that NATO is taking in additional members without 
properly addressing the seriousness of the obligation to provide for the collective defense 
of these countries.  Collective defense has played an extremely minor role in the 
discussions that have occurred over the last two rounds of Alliance enlargement.  The 
most obvious reason for this lack of discussion is the third implication above, a desire not 
to unnecessarily provoke Russia, which would most often be identified as the threat to an 
Alliance country.  The other issue that goes into this is that currently Russia is too weak 
to pose a credible conventional threat to a member country. 
F. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) 
The Partnership for Peace was an initiative introduced at the Brussels Summit of 
the North Atlantic Council in January 1994 to create a framework from which NATO 
could work with non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region as partners.  As stated 
before, PfP grew out of the dialogue that began with NACC in 1991.  The idea behind 
PfP is that NATO and partner countries working together will enhance the security and 
stability of Europe.  The PfP framework document called for the pursuit of the following 
objectives: 
a. Facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and 
budgeting processes; 
b. Ensuring democratic control of defense forces; 
c. Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to 
constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN 
and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; 
d. The development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the 
purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen 
their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search 
and rescue, humanitarian operations, and other as may subsequently be 
agreed; 
e. The development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to 
operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.25 
                                                 
25 North Atlantic Council, Partnership for Peace Framework Document, Brussels, 1994, paragraph 3. 
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 PfP uses defense-related cooperation as a springboard to forging stronger political 
and military ties.  With these stronger ties, the Alliance hopes, a country will embrace 
democratic values fully and continue the reforms that it has begun. 
Any country wishing to join the Partnership for Peace must first sign the 
Framework Document.  This Framework Document identifies the goals of PfP.  The 
signers reaffirm their political commitment to democratic societies, international law, the 
Charter of the United Nations, the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, respect of sovereignty, rejection of force and desire to resolve disputes through 
peaceful means.  After signing, the country will submit a Presentation Document to 
NATO describing its plan to achieve necessary political goals, the military and other 
assets that will be available for Partnership purposes, and the specific areas of 
cooperation that the Partner wishes to pursue jointly with NATO.26 
After reviewing the Presentation Document with the aspirant country, that country 
and NATO work together to develop an Individual Partnership Program (IPP).  The IPP 
specifies the political aims, the assets to be made available to PfP, areas of cooperation 
and the objectives and activities to be pursued in those areas.  As a country participates, it 
will meet with NATO for the Planning and Review Process (PARP).  PfP/PARP is a 
program tailored for each country that allows a country to move toward interoperability 
with NATO and conduct necessary preparations for possible future membership.  
Countries that choose to closely integrate with NATO can, through PARP, biannually 
exchange information on defense plans and budgets and identify areas to improve 
military interoperability with NATO for peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and 
search and rescue.27   
G. MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP) 
The Membership Action Plan was developed in 1999 to help countries that wish 
to become Alliance members in their preparations for accession.  The genesis for MAP 
came from the difficult experiences of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 
meeting the requirements of the Alliance.  NATO wanted to provide a better support 
system for countries making the necessary reforms for membership and to reassure other 
                                                 
26 NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 2001,   69. 
27 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Seucity, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998,   72-4. 
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 countries that enlargement would continue.  In order to give aspiring nations a more 
comprehensive explanation of the requirements and potential impact beyond the 
ministries of foreign affairs and defense, the MAP provides “advice, assistance and 
practical support on all aspects of NATO membership.”28  Jeffrey Simon identifies the 
specific civil-military conditions that must be met for membership as:  a clear 
constitutional or legal division of authority between president and government; 
parliamentary oversight of the military through budgetary control; peacetime oversight of 
general staff and military commanders from civilian defense ministers; and military 
effectiveness through a restoration of prestige, trustworthiness and accountability.29 
Despite the inclusion of seven of the nine 2001 MAP participants in the expansion 
announced at the Prague Summit, participation in MAP does not assure future 
membership.  Nor is it meant to be used as a checklist on the way to membership.  MAP 
provides a wide range of activities that countries can participate in to strengthen their 
candidacy, and the candidate country will receive feedback and advice from NATO 
concerning its preparations for membership. 
MAP is not meant to replace PfP, but instead to be a complementary program.  It 
is based on the principle of self-differentiation, in that countries are free to choose the 
elements of MAP which are best suited to their circumstances.  Countries submit an 
Annual National Program to identify the steps they are taking in a variety of areas to 
prepare for membership.  The North Atlantic Council meets with each aspiring country to 
discuss progress that has been made.  Four key areas stand out when reviewing a 
country’s progress:  defense and military issues; resource issues; security issues; and 
legal issues. 
H. INVITATIONS TO NEW MEMBERS 
At the Madrid Summit in 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were 
invited to become new members so that membership in the Alliance would take effect by 
the Washington Summit in 1999.  This summit was a celebration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of NATO.  
                                                 
28 Ibid,  65.   
29 Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, 
Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 1996,  26-7. 
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 Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin 
accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of Accession 
at the time of the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the 
ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective 
by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999. During 
the period leading to accession, the Alliance will involve invited countries, 
to the greatest extent possible and where appropriate, in Alliance 
activities, to ensure that they are best prepared to undertake the 
responsibilities and obligations of membership in an enlarged Alliance. 
We direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop appropriate 
arrangements for this purpose.30 
The creation of MAP at the Washington Summit affirmed the principle of a continued 
open door to the Alliance. 
At the 2002 Prague Summit, a similar welcoming statement was made to invite 
seven more countries to join the Alliance. 
Today, we have decided to invite Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks to join our 
Alliance. We congratulate them on this historic occasion, which so 
fittingly takes place in Prague. The accession of these new members will 
strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and help achieve our 
common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace and by common 
values. NATO’s door will remain open to European democracies willing 
and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, in 
accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.31 
Key to these statements is the commitment to expand the Alliance to “willing and 
able” European democracies.  That offers hope for the Vilnius 10 countries that have 
been left behind and, perhaps, for others that have not yet formally requested 
membership. 
Of the seven countries invited to join NATO at Prague, five of them are relatively 
insignificant military (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia).  “The 
problem…is that despite the willingness of all these aspirants and especially those in the 
Baltics to support the Alliance in general and the United States in particular, these 
                                                 
30 North Atlantic Council, Madrid Declaration, paragraph 6. 
31 North Atlantic Council, Prague Declaration, paragraph 2. 
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 countries have limited resources, populations and capabilities.”32  The limited 
capabilities that these countries bring to the alliance likely played a large role in bringing 
in Romania and Bulgaria so that “At least one country either of some size or geostrategic 
location [could] make this round of enlargement look like a meaningful endeavour from a 
military point of view.”33  However, political and economic difficulties in both of those 
countries make the point that “soft” goals can be manipulated by the Alliance when it 
serves the Alliance’s interests.34 
I. RELEVANCE TO CROATIA 
Croatia hopes to be a part of the next round of NATO enlargement that may be 
considered for 2007.  NATO’s continued willingness to keep its door open is very 
important to Croatia, which got a late start on joining the institutions of Europe (when 
compared to the other countries of eastern and central Europe) due to the homeland war 
and the instability the war caused.  The negative impression that many European 
countries have of the Balkans as a region contributes to the Balkan countries being put in 
the background.  The decisions and biases of NATO countries when determining how to 
deal with the instability in the Balkans in the 1990s created many obstacles for Croatia 
moving toward the rest of Europe.  Certainly, Croatian policies that emphasized 
nationalism and bordered on authoritarianism did little to help its cause. 
It is important to get an understanding of the history of Croatia’s journey toward 
the North Atlantic Alliance.  Tito’s death in 1980; the rotating presidency among the six 
                                                 
32 James M. Goldgeier, “Not When but Who,” NATO Review, Spring 2002 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue1/art2.html (accessed 1/24/2003) 
33 Ibid.  Significantly, Goldgeier does not point to the specific military capabilities that Romania and 
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 republics of Yugoslavia after his death; and the fall of the Berlin Wall all led for calls for 
independence from five of the eight federal units.35  In April 1990, free elections were 
held in Slovenia, followed soon by elections in Croatia.  These were the first free 
elections in the history of Yugoslavia.  Slovenia and Croatia were two of those five 
federal units that wanted independence and both declared their independence on 25 June 
1991. 
The elections held in Croatia in the spring of 1990 brought Franjo Tuđman to the 
Presidency.  He was an authoritarian leader and his party, the Croatian Democratic Union 
(HDZ), had gained 69% of the parliament seats despite only receiving 42% of the popular 
vote due to an oddly designed electoral system.36  The nationalist HDZ party and 
Tuđman sought to bring back the icons of Croatian history.  These icons (like the 
Croatian coat of arms) brought out fears of societal division that were played upon by 
Serbian leaders in Croatia and in Serbia.  Tuđman never properly addressed these fears to 
the public.  In fact, he made them worse through the wording of a new constitution that 
proclaimed that Croatia was “the national state of the Croatian nation” and that “The 
Croatian language and Latin script shall be in official use in the Republic of Croatia.” 37  
The Serb minority believed that discrimination was inherent in these constitutional 
statements. 
Serb fears were based on Tuđman’s nationalist agenda that sought to raise 
Croatians to dominance within the country.  This was done in a variety of ways.  Tuđman 
emphasized that money earned in Croatia would remain in Croatia, a reference to the 
feeling of economic hardship that the Croatians felt in supporting poorer republics in 
Yugoslavia, Kosovo particularly.  He established a Croatian news agency to counter the 
                                                 
35 The eight federal units included the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia and the two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina.  Branka Magas, The Destruction of 
Yugoslavia Tracking the Breakup 1980-92, Verso, London, 1993,  336 
36 Prior to the elections, the communists, who were then in power, established an electoral system that 
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This support from Croatians abroad swung the election in favor of the nationalists.  John Mueller, “The 
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Association, 31 Aug-3 Sep 2000,   6.  Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, New York:  Times 
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37 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 1990, Section I and Section II, Article 12 
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 influence of the Belgrade based Tanjug agency.  He sought to create monuments to all 
who had sacrificed themselves in war trying to create the Croatian homeland.  He spoke 
of the Independent Croatian state of the Second World War in generous terms.  While he 
acknowledged that it was a “fascist crime,” Tuđman identified it as an expression of “the 
Croatian nation’s historic desire for an independent homeland.”  In other words, crimes 
committed against other ethnic groups during the war were distorted manifestations of a 
sound idea of nationalism.  Tuđman’s impulse for doing this was to gain the support of a 
large Croatian Diaspora, whose money contributed greatly to his election.  Another 
aspect of this nationalism was the purge of Serbs from governmental positions.  With all 
these factors, it is understandable that Serbs believed they would be a weak and 
defenseless minority in Tuđman’s Croatia.38 
Croatian Serbs tried to secede from Croatia and were supported by the policies of 
Serbian President Slobodan Milosević. Included in those policies came a war with 
Croatia that involved the Yugoslav People’s Army and paramilitary forces that lasted 
until 1995.  The Homeland War forced Croatia to build an army from scratch in order to 
defend itself from this aggression.  Building that army, which grew from special police 
units and the national guard, and having to have that army fight for the preservation of 
the country, put a great deal of strain on the civil-military relationship.  In fact, it 
distorted greatly the relationship between the armed forces and elected officials who are 
to provide oversight.  The need to quickly establish a force that could defend the nation 
overcame other thoughts in its design.  As one can imagine, this defense buildup and war 
have greatly colored the ability to gain control of the military establishment in Croatia 
and seek reform.  Croatia’s responsibilities in helping implement the Dayton Peace 
Accords and the poor record of the Tuđman government in following through with those 
responsibilities cast an unfavorable light on Croatia in the eyes of western governments. 
This lack of reform and lack of a commitment to stability and peace with its neighbors 
have been major stumbling blocks to movement toward NATO. 
Croatia first announced its desire to participate in PfP in January 1994 through 
Foreign Minister Mate Granic.  This desire had to wait for an end to the war with Serbia, 
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 the death of President Tuđman, and certain reforms before NATO would take it seriously.   
The end of the war was difficult to achieve.  The Serbs controlled nearly one-third of 
Croatian territory from 1991 to 1995.  UN forces were sent as peacekeepers and Cyrus 
Vance and David Owen negotiated a fragile peace that collapsed under resistance from 
all parties.  In August and September 1995, the Croats and Muslims conducted the 
Western Offensive to regain the Krajina and parts of Central Bosnia that had been 
controlled by Serbs from previous attacks.  The success of this offensive changed the 
dynamic in Bosnia and led to a window of opportunity for diplomatic negotiations that 
brought about the Dayton Accords.  Tuđman died in December 1999 and his death 
ushered in a new era of politics in Croatia as an opposition alliance defeated the HDZ at 
the polls.39  
The elections of January and February 2000 brought about the new government of 
President Stjepan Mesić and Prime Minister Ivica Račan.  This Croatian Administration 
identified membership in NATO as a key foreign policy goal.40  Croatia officially 
applied for integration into the PfP back in May 1997, but it was after these elections 
showed the promise of reform that on 25 May 2000, Croatia was admitted into the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council and PfP as the 26th partner.  The government knew as well 
that becoming a part of MAP was essential to Croatia’s future. 
In order to achieve that strategic goal, Croatia undertook the appropriate 
organizational changes in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and established “The Interagency Working Group for Cooperation Between 
Croatia and NATO” consisting of representatives from ten key ministries and the Office 
of the President with the main purpose of producing the Annual National Plan (ANP) as a 
basis for MAP.41   
The government has tackled three specific areas that were issues for the Alliance 
with President Tuđman.  Those issues were:  ending the conflict with Bosnia-
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 Herzegovina; support of the international war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY); and the attitude concerning the return of Croatian Serb refugees to Croatia.   
Progress on those issues helped bring about the decision by NATO foreign ministers 
meeting in Reykjavik to invite Croatia to join the process of the Membership Action 
Plan, on 14 May 2002.42  The first Annual National Program report to NATO was due in 
the autumn of 2002.   
Croatia has worked hard to prove its worth in PfP and MAP.  It has provided 
support for peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Ethiopia/Eritrea and also hosted 
the 2002 PfP fire fighting exercise Taming the Dragon.  This regional exercise brought 
“1100 personnel from 19 countries…including every country in South-East Europe…All 
in all, “Taming the Dragon” was the largest civilian Partnership for Peace exercise ever.  
It was an extraordinary success, not least because Croatia did an outstanding job in the 
organization and conduct of the exercise.”43 
While this support of PfP and MAP is laudable, a number of reforms were 
identified as necessary for Croatia to join the Alliance:  the reduction of the armed forces 
from a wartime size to a peacetime one; education of the officer corps; standardization of 
equipment; modernization of the armed forces; an end to the politicization of the armed 
forces; an independent judiciary; and good relations with minorities and neighbors.44 
There are significant hurdles that Croatia must overcome to meet all of these 
requirements, but they are similar to the problems encountered by other countries that 
have been accepted into the Alliance over the past six years.  Despite numerous 
differences in post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, a similar pattern 
of problems has emerged.  The problems include: the loss of rationale and ideology in the 
armed forces with the end of communism; massive force reductions brought about by 
political, economic and geo-strategic concerns; a lack of civilian oversight, in part due to 
the fall of the communist bureaucracy, and in part due to a lack of defense expertise; 
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 young officer attrition due to poor conditions and inability to properly recognize good 
performance; military leadership resistance to change and attempts to protect and retain 
elements of the armed forces from reform; lack of budget transparency; and confusion 
and apathy concerning service in the armed forces that defeats attempts to move from 
conscription based to volunteer based personnel systems.45 
If the country was able to overcome those problems, what might be the benefits 
and liabilities of Croatian membership in NATO?  The benefits to Croatia, surprisingly, 
do not rest overwhelmingly with military support.  Instead it is for economics and “soft 
power” issues like influence and shared values.  Benefits to Croatia include: economic 
foreign direct investment and the change in perceptions that will bring concerning 
investment; implementation of mature democratic policies; and the feeling of belonging 
to a circle of countries with shared values.46 
The benefits to NATO from admission of Croatia are many:  an increase in the 
security and stability zone into South-East Europe; alliance membership covering an 
important geo-strategic location; the use or availability of Croatian military 
infrastructure, especially naval bases; and the interoperability of a Croatian military 
already well versed in U.S. programs and training standards.47 
The earlier arguments given for enlargement of the alliance generally apply to 
Croatia as well.  In addition, Croatia has focused on the professionalization of the armed 
forces with particular emphasis on English language training and fully funding officers to 
American and German schools.  The professional education, when combined with the 
successful operations with NATO during the war against Serbia, shows the ability of 
Croatian forces to interoperate as well as any of the other applicants.48 
                                                 
45 Chris Donnelly, “Military matters:  Reform realities,” NATO Review, Autumn 2002.  13-15.  
46 Cepanec,  94-96 
47 Croatian membership in NATO would create a land bridge from the central European member countries 
(Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) to the Mediterranean.  In addition, the Croatian coasts boasts four naval bases 
(Ploce, Pula, Sibenik and Split), refer to figure1 , that would provide excellent sea points of embarkation onto 
amphibious or transport ships for an expeditionary force moving from central Europe on an “out of area mission.”   
Ibid,  96-99.  Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans, “Navy, Croatia”, http://80-
www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/search97/vs.vts?action=View&VdkVgwKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/c
roas130.htm&collection=current&Prod_Name=BALK&QueryZip=Croatia (accessed 15 May 2003) 
48 Cepanec,  88-89 
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 While the general arguments against expansion have essentially been repudiated 
by the “Big Bang” at Prague, there are some other issues that hold back Croatia.  First of 
all is the issue of human rights violations during the Homeland War and the need to turn 
the suspected war criminals over to the ICTY.  Second is the need to reduce force size so 
that modernization can be pursued.  Along with that modernization will come a NATO-
interoperable system of weapons.  The continued movement toward democratic, civilian 
control of the armed forces is the final issue. 
The specter of Serbian instability has in the past drawn Croatia back from a future 
as a part of a new Europe to a past where Europe isolates the Balkans and lumps all the 
countries in the region together as violent and unstable.  The assassination of Serbian 
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March 2003 has brought about a host of negative 
parallels with other times in history that could influence the prospects for Croatia’s 
membership in NATO.49  The ability of Serbia to deal with the disorder and violence 
associated with organized crime may taint Croatia’s bid to become a part of the North 
Atlantic Alliance if potential instability from the state of emergency and the influence of 
organized crime in the region cross over the border into Croatia. 
Another issue that will have bearing on the support of the United States for 
Croatia’s membership is the position that the Croatian Government takes on the issue of 
extradition of Americans to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  In 2002, the United 
States began to make bilateral treaties with countries that they will not extradite U.S. 
citizens to the ICC.  This American policy is in direct contrast to the European Union 
policy on the ICC.  Croatian leaders are torn in their decision concerning the treaty 
because they risk losing the support of the EU member countries for accession or losing 
the support of the United States.  Loss of U.S. support would mean loss of all military 
assistance and perhaps withdraw of U.S. support to Croatia’s candidacy to NATO.50  
                                                 
49 Michael T. Kauffman, “Killings Shaped Serbia and Also Roiled Europe”, New York Times, 13 Mar 
2003, A10. 
50 “Croatia wants ICC Exemption solution to be in line with EU advice,” Hina News Agency, Zagreb, 
29 May 2003.  “Peace Studies Centre slams U.S. Ambassador’s pressure on Croatia,” Hina News Agency, 
Zagreb, 16 May 2003. “Croatian Premier refuses to be drawn on International Criminal Court,” Hina News 
Agency, Zagreb, 28 May 2003. 
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 J. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed a number of issues regarding NATO’s Open Door and 
its relevance to Croatia.  It has identified the background and processes for NATO’s 
enlargement and the key roles that Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action 
Plan play.  It has covered the arguments for and against enlargement and some of the 
implications for this policy.  It identified the invitations to membership made at NATO 
Summits in Madrid and Prague to new countries.  And finally, it examined how Croatia 
fits into the picture with the enlargement of NATO. 
Croatia fits easily into the template for enlargement that has been set by the 
Prague Summit.  Continued political and military reform would make Croatia the most 
promising of the remaining candidates for membership.  As stated above, the key issues 
are political and they include Croatian compliance with the ICTY, the European 
impression of the level of instability in the Balkans and whether Croatia’s inclusion in the 
Alliance will provide more stability or expose the Alliance to instability and, finally, the 
ability of Croatia to position itself on the issue of extradition of Americans to the ICC 
without losing the support of either American or European Union benefactors.  These key 
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 III. EVOLUTION OF THE CROATIAN MILITARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Croatian military in its modern form is a young institution.  However, certain 
features can be traced back to the 19th century quest for Croatian nation-hood.  While 
Croatia realized that nation-hood for a short time during the Second World War, the 
Ustaše regime lost it, along with the civil war, to forces led by Josip Broz Tito.  Tito 
created the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and its Yugoslav People’s 
Army (JNA) as multi-ethnic institutions.  This quest for multi-ethnicity did not survive 
long after Tito’s death in 1980 and the nationalist calls for statehood and the 
accompanying military to defend that statehood won the day.  After declaring 
independence in 1991, the threat of war caused the birth of the Croatian armed forces 
(HV) and also paramilitary groups to defend the newly independent state.  The Homeland 
War pitted the HV against the JNA and Croatian and Bosnian Serbs.  The excesses and 
atrocities of the war had a profound effect on the armed forces.  In addition, the HV came 
into being under an authoritarian government that used the war as an opportunity to wrest 
full control of the military.  President Franjo Tuđman created a lasting legacy in the 
armed forces that is only slowly being reversed as the country has moved from 
authoritarianism to democracy. 
  This chapter will review the historical influences on the HV and their role in its 
evolution.  These influences include:  the establishment of the Ustaše-led independent 
Croatian state in 1941; the victory of Tito and the establishment of the JNA; the gradual 
political and military marginalization of Croatians within Yugoslavia; the influence of 
paramilitary groups; the requirement to create the HV to defend Croatia in the early 
1990s; and the effect of the Homeland War.   
B. CROATIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
The years leading up to the Second World War saw the rise of the Ustaše  
(meaning “Insurgents”) in Croatia.  It began as a secret nationalist organization that, 
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 under the leadership of Ante Pavelić, sought the creation of a greater Croatia.1  Pavelić 
was supported by Italian leader Benito Mussolini and German Chancellor Adolf Hitler.  
The coup against Regent Prince Paul in March 1941 brought a Nazi invasion of 
Yugoslavia and gave the Ustaše the opportunity they sought to create an independent 
Croatia.  On April 10, 1941, on a day that the Nazis were sweeping through Belgrade, 
Pavelić’s Ustaše established an independent Croatian state (NDH) as a protectorate for 
the Axis powers.2 
The coup created a civil war within Yugoslavia setting the Ustaše, pro-royalist 
Četniks, and Tito’s Partisans against each other.  This fighting was extremely bloody for 
all sides in Yugoslavia.3  The fighting of these groups was not simply for the 
independence of their countries but also due to an intense persecution of other ethnic 
groups by the Ustaše.  The NDH‘s treatment of its Serbian, Jewish and Romany subjects, 
and of anti-Ustaše Croats, was so brutal and murderous that thousands flocked to the 
                                                 
1 The idea of “greater Croatia” can be traced back to the mid-1830s and then the revolutions of 1848.  
After Prince Metternich resigned as the Austrian Chancellor, demonstrations in Zagreb called for greater 
local control in Croatia.  In addition, the Illyrian nationalists wanted a unification of Dalmatia and Slavonia, 
a charter of rights, annual meetings of the Sabor, abolishment of the Krajina (the frontier where the 
Austrians had fortified against the Turks in earlier centuries), use of the Croatian language in government 
service and education, the establishment of a Croatian army and the appointment of Colonel Josip Jelacic as 
the Croatian Ban (a term of nobility similar to prince).   This desire for greater autonomy was supported by 
the Habsburg monarchy, which sought to use Croatian quest for equality with Vienna and Budapest as a 
way to maintain Austrian preeminence within the Dual Monarchy.  Austria occupied Bosnia-Hercegovina 
in 1878.  Serbia sought a return to the greater prominence that it had from the 15th through 17th centuries.  
Serbia coveted Bosnia-Hercegovina as a key part of “greater Serbia” and saw Austrian occupation as 
delaying or denying the prospects of reclaiming that region.  Serbia was convinced that it would be the 
Piedmont of the south Slavs and act as ideologue and leader of unification to which other south Slavs 
would defer.  This position greatly angered Illyrian nationalists who argued that Croatia should establish its 
own state consisting fo Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.  Thus began a rivalry 
between the two states over which would dominate and absorb Bosnia-Hercegovina into itself. “Greater 
Croatia” re-emerges in the 1930s as home rule was offered to a Greater Croatia encompassing parts of BiH, 
Dalmatia, Slavonia and the Krajina. While this agreement fell apart upon the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, 
it was established against under the Ustaše  and Ante Pavlevic.  Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation forged 
in War, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997,   82-6.  Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War 
and the Great Powers, 1804-1999, New York, Penguin Books, 2001,  252-6.  Spyros Sofos, “Culture, 
Politics and Identity in Former Yugoslavia,” in Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe, Jenkins and 
Sofos (eds), New York: Routledge, 1996. p 255-256.  Jill Irvine, The Croat Question, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1993,   23-28. 
2 Mark Thompson, A Paper House:  The Ending of Yugoslavia, New York: Pantheon Books, 1992,  
266. 
3 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel:  The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to 
Ethnic War, 2d Ed, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996,  200-201 
30
 resistance forces, especially the Partisans.4  Pavelić’s plan to purify Croatia was three-
fold:  convert 1/3 of Serbs to Catholicism, expel 1/3 from the country and kill the 
remainder.  It was a plan that seems significantly influenced by Hitler’s final solution, 
though not as organized.  The methods used by the Ustaše to kill were primitive including 
the use of axe blades, ropes, and blunt instruments.  These crude means were used even 
inside the concentration camps.5 
The fascist leadership of Croatia militarized the society and set it on a quest for a 
greater Croatia.  Pavelić, a puppet of the Axis, did not have full control over Croatia.  In 
fact, German and Italian leaders initially did not want Croatia to develop any sizeable 
armed forced and collected the majority of arms left in Croatia by the old Yugoslav army.  
The Ustaše had a limited militia (200-300) that it had brought from exile with Pavelić and 
they turned to the Civic Guards, a paramilitary organization of the Croatian Peasant 
Party, to conduct military tasks.  After a period of time, the government was allowed a 
regular army (known as the Domobrans) and the Civic Guards were disarmed and 
replaced by the Domobrans and the Ustaše militia.  For a period of months, there were 
also local Ustaše militias that were not under any control from Zagreb.6 
The Germans allowed the creation of the Domobrans because they sought to use 
the units to fight the Soviets.  Three Croatian regular divisions, led by German officers, 
were trained and equipped to be on the Russian front.  Only one regiment ever made it to 
those battlefields due to the increasing threat posed by the Partisans.  The units were used 
in Croatia instead and German units were sent to train and arm more Croatian units.  At 
its height, in 1943, the Croatian armed forces amounted to 262,000 men.  Of these 
170,000 were under German command, leaving 92,000 under Croatian command.  Of the 
units led by Croatians the largest group was the Ustaše Militia and Pavelić’s personal 
guard at 28,500.  The Croatian armed forces never functioned as anything more than an 
adjunct for the Wehrmacht.  Whenever German forces were engaged in Croatia, the 
                                                 
4 Thompson,  266-7.  Jožo Tomasevich, War and Revolution inn Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, Volume I, 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975,  106. 
5 Thompson,  267 
6 The local militias often committed some of the worst atrocities, feeding on an intense nationalism 
with no direction from the leadership to direct their actions.  Tomasevich, 106-7. 
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 Croatian forces operated under German command.7 
Despite the size of the Domobrans, it was not a good fighting force.  Morale was 
low and the officers did not believe in the Axis cause and were not politically reliable.  
Many Domobran soldiers of all ranks were Partisan sympathizers and, later in the war, 
had plans to collaborate with the Allies had there been a landing in Dalmatia.  The Ustaše 
Militia, on the other hand, was a party army composed of fully indoctrinated volunteers 
who were devoted to Pavelić.  It was an excellent combat force but was undisciplined and 
unable to work with the Domobrans or the German commanders.  Within Croatia, the 
Croatian leaders were given very little freedom of maneuver by the Axis.  The exception 
to this was in dealing with the Serbian population and others that the Ustaše saw as 
threats.  Thus, the Ustaše set its militia and the armed forces under its control on the only 
enemy that it was given the freedom to attack.8 
The Ustaše battled the Četniks and Partisans in a civil war that the Partisans 
ultimately won.9  However the animosity that was created during this time due to 
atrocities on both sides has remained in the post-war years to play upon nationalist 
feelings and to further ideas for greater Croatian autonomy within Yugoslavia or, 
conversely, Serbian dominance of Yugoslavia.10 
C. THE MILITARY IN TITO’S YUGOSLAVIA 
After winning the civil war and playing a role in defeating the Axis in 
Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito sought to consolidate his power over Yugoslavia and its 
                                                 
7 Ibid,  107. 
8 Ibid,   318, 182, 108. 
9 As noted, the Ustaše  were a Croatian fascist party that had come to power with the support of the 
Axis powers and with the goal of an independent Croatian state under the ideas espoused by those who 
sought a “Greater Croatia.”  The Četniks were a pro-royalist Serbian group, led by Mihailovic, that sought 
the continued existence of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia under the reign of the Karadjordjević family who 
was in exile in London.  The primacy of the goal to return the Kingdom intact prevented the Četniks from 
being able to fight against the Axis, the Ustaše  or the Partisans in the manner they would, tying their hands 
in tactics and objectives.  The Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, were a communist organization that sought 
to bring about revolution to Yugoslavia and the establishment of a communist state.  It drew its 
membership from each of the ethnic groups and proved itself to be the most effective fighting force in 
Yugoslavia.  It defeated the Ustaše  and Četniks and was very successful against the Axis powers, gaining 
control of the country as Axis forces regrouped and withdrew based on the Soviet advance in 1944. 
10 During the 1960s, Tudjman researched the number of deaths attributed to the Ustaše.  He believed 
the Serbs had exaggerated the numbers of people killed for nationalistic propaganda and to inflame anti-
Croat feelings within Yugoslavia allowing Serbs to forever label any movement for Croatian nationalism as 
“fascist” and thus continue to limit Croatian influence in Yugoslavia.  Thompson,  268 
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 military.  He built the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) upon the foundation of the 
Partisan movement that he had created and led to victory.  While consolidating his power, 
he also drove the Ustaše out of power in Croatia, driving many into Austria and 
destroying the rest. 
Tito created the JNA to be a multi-ethnic force that represented all of Yugoslavia 
and was answerable to him as the Commander in Chief.  The army looked to Tito for 
leadership and ideological foundation.  Tito had emerged from the Second World War as 
the leader of a new Communist nation and the most trusted lieutenant of Soviet General 
Secretary Josef Stalin.  He had liberated the country from the Axis powers, won a civil 
war and created a new state.  His prominence in the Communist world was symbolized 
by the establishment of the headquarters of the Communist Information Bureau 
(Cominform) in Belgrade as a show of Stalin’s gratitude for Tito’s loyalty.   
Tito’s role as the ideological guide for Yugoslavia and the JNA became even 
stronger in 1948 when the Soviet Union expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform. The 
specific rift between Tito and Stalin made him an even greater figure domestically and 
internationally.  Tito became the leader of the non-aligned movement and played the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO against each other to gain economic and military support for 
Yugoslavia.  After Stalin’s death, Kruschev in 1955 came to Belgrade (not Tito to 
Moscow) to rebuild diplomatic ties between the parties, and Tito insisted that any 
warming of relations would be done between the states and not through the parties.  
These events displayed the power and influence that Tito wielded.  The Hungarian 
Revolution in 1956 brought heightened tensions to Soviet-Yugoslav relations.  The 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 reaffirmed for Tito a need to keep free of the 
Soviet sphere of influence.  These invasions identified a potential threat to Yugoslav 
sovereignty that the JNA must defend.  Tito’s vision of Yugoslavia and its place in the 
world provided the raison d’etre for the JNA.  Nearly ten years after Tito’s death the 
archway over a JNA barracks in Sarajevo still read “Our future lies on Tito’s path.”11   
Tito’s death, however, had a profound effect on the JNA.  Tito had been 
Commander in Chief for life of the armed forces, he took care of the armed forces and he 
                                                 
11 Ibid,  290 
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 used them to pressure republics to submit to his will and a greater Yugoslavia.  Since the 
1980s however, the JNA was in decline, unable to meet goals for recruiting and retention 
and with a shrinking budget.12  The high leadership never encouraged reform and tried to 
stick to Tito’s path.  The Chiefs of Staff saw themselves as the last guarantor of the 
SFRY’s integrity.13  They still wielded political influence through representation in 
republican assemblies and the Secretary of Defense (a professional military man) seat on 
the federal presidency.  But the changes to Yugoslavia had brought diminished influence 
as the military budget was reduced and political influence was dependent on partnership 
with the unified League of Communists. 
The JNA also saw the increasing movement toward greater autonomy and 
independence from the republics and feared that they would become an army without a 
state.14  The JNA was also a bureaucracy that, like any bureaucracy was bound to be 
more centralized in its outlook and thus looked down on the increasing calls for 
independence of the republics.  Those calls for independence included an anti-militarist 
slant in Slovenia leading to a campaign against military corruption and for recognition of 
the right of conscientious objection.  The anger felt by the officer corps over these issues 
was accentuated by its ethnic makeup, which was nearly 70% Serb and Montenegrin.15  
National proportionality in the JNA was not an easy issue to resolve.  JNA leaders saw 
the demographic trends that were leading to an increasingly unbalanced officer corps but 
had a very difficult time recruiting sufficient numbers of Slovenes, Croats, Albanians and 
Hungarians to serve.  The reduced interest of young people to serve in the JNA, 
especially from the most developed regions (Slovenia and Croatia) meant that ethnic 
balance in the JNA was jeopardized and it increasingly came to be controlled by Serbs.16  
These officers saw in Slovenian and Croatian desires for independence the seeds of the 
                                                 
12 Almond, Mark, Europe’s Backyard War:  The War in the Balkans, Great Britain: Mandarin, 1994,  
224 
13 Thompson,  291 
14 This is the repeated fear of Gen Veljko Kadijevic the Yugoslav Federal Secretary for the People’s 
Defense.  Martin Spegelj, “The First Phase, 1990-1992:  the JNA prepares for aggression and Croatia for 
Defense,” in Magas & Zanic, The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995, London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2001,  22. 
15 Based on information as of April 1991.  Thompson  291. 
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16 James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military:  The Yugoslav Crisis, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992,  
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 end of their nation (Yugoslavia) and their army as the protector of that nation.  The JNA 
was becoming an army without a state. 
There was a desire in the JNA to return to the certainties of Tito’s Yugoslavia. 
The JNA sought the elevated place within the political framework that Tito had assured 
them, the certainty of a unified nation and the certainty of its role as the guarantors of 
Yugoslavia’s sovereignty.  To JNA leadership, Serbia seemed to be the only republic 
within Yugoslavia willing to provide the political will to keep Yugoslavia together.  The 
desire for those certainties, led to the JNA increasingly becoming a Serb Army, first in 
the officer corps and then, after the war with Slovenia, throughout its ranks.  The JNA 
also created a political party, the League of Communists, in December 1990 to help it 
play an independent role in Yugoslav politics.17 
The armed forces of Yugoslavia were made up of the JNA and the territorial 
defense (TO) units that were controlled by the specific republics.  These TO units are 
analogous to the national guard and are responsible to the leadership of the specific 
republic.  In the late 1980s, the high command of the JNA underwent defense 
reorganization that was explained as streamlining the armed forces.  This reorganization 
placed TO under federal military control, disbanded and reorganized the TO of Kosovo 
and disarmed the TO of the other republics that was outside army control.  “The real 
meaning and purpose of this disarmament, carried out in May 1990, can be deduced from 
the fact that it was strictly carried out only in Slovenia and Croatia—of course, without 
the knowledge of the political leadership of those republics…The changes meant that the 
TO forces lost all effective connection with their own republics.”18  Restructuring of the 
TO units throughout SFRY removed any ties of a political-administrative region with 
military command borders.19  In other words, those two republics had just been robbed of 
their armed forces and the ability to defend themselves from the JNA. 
                                                 
17 Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia  Tracking the Break-up 1980-92, London: Verso, 
1993,  341 
18 Stepjan Mesić, “The Road to War,” in Magaš & Žanić,  10.  TO units had been established to 
reinforce JNA and also conduct guerilla operations against an invader.  Updated threat assessments through 
the 1970 and 1980s called for greater centralization to provide a more concentrated effort against invasion.  
This gradually led to less and less control by the republics, such that the change in the late 1980s while 
significant was not seen as politically motivated.  Gow,  46-50, 98-102. 
19 Gow,   97. 
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 D. THE PATH TO WAR 
The years following Tito’s death saw internal power struggles within Yugoslavia.  
Serbian leaders, accustomed to dominating the federation, saw their influence slipping 
away as other republics wanted to play a larger role in the decisions of the federation and 
barring that, independence.  The infamous “Memorandum on Current Social Issues in 
Our Country” written by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1986 established a 
high standard for nationalistic rhetoric.  The memorandum claimed that  
Serbia was being exploited, and that the Serb nation suffered 
discrimination.  They cited Slovenia and Croatia as leaders of an anti-Serb 
coalition and sought a solution in the physical separation of Serbs from 
other nations.  At the same time they launched the ridiculous but insidious 
assertion that Serbia and the Serbs have always been victors in war and 
losers in peace.20   
As Slovenia and Croatia began their planning for elections to be held in 1990, 
Serb nationalists seized upon this as further proof of the desire to build an anti-Serb 
coalition.  Of course the resistance to Serbian leadership in the federation obstructed the 
goals of maintaining Yugoslavia intact (under Serbian dominance) or if that failed, 
creating a greater Serbia.  The Serb nationalists (by this time the only ones left in 
positions of power after Milosević had purged the party) saw multi-party elections in 
Croatia as tantamount to a declaration of war.21  
A program of intense anti-Croat propaganda began in Serbia charging that 
“ustasoid, neo-Nazi, fascistic, genocidal Croats” were going to take power in Croatia.  
The propaganda also alleged that “united Germany and Austria wanted, perhaps in 
combination with NATO, to smash Yugoslavia, finishing once and for all what they had 
attempted in 1914 and 1941.”22  After the elections in Croatia, Belgrade and the JNA 
worked to obstruct and provoke Tuđman and the government by working with radicals in 
Serb communities and providing direct military support to Serbs that blockaded their 
towns.  
                                                 
20 Magas & Zanic,  6 
21 Magas,  340 
22 Thompson  292 
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 E. THE HOMELAND WAR:  BUILDING AN ARMY 
After Tuđman came to power, he began a series of reforms that were nationalistic 
in intent and fanned the flames of mistrust from the Serbs.  His initial steps were to bring 
back signs of Croatia’s past, such as the Croatian Coat of Arms on the flag.  Many Serbs 
associated these symbols with the Ustaše and saw Tuđman trying to recreate the regime 
that existed during the Second World War.  Further, he sought to undo the over-
representation of Serbs in civil service with a Croatization campaign, and rewrote the 
constitution to make Croatia the land of the Croatian nation and to make the Latin 
alphabet (used by Croats) the official language, prohibiting Cyrillic (used by Serbs) from 
official use.23  In addition to those outward signs, Tuđman goals included a greater 
Croatia created by partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) with Serbia and bringing the 
western part of BiH (with a large Croat population) to Croatia while giving the eastern 
half to Serbia.24  All of these steps caused Croatian Serbs to call for secession from 
Croatia and they received the support of Milosević and the JNA, in addition to 
paramilitaries. 
As Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia, portions of the Krajina 
declared their independence from Croatia.  One of the leaders in the city of Knin was the 
police chief Milan Martic who had been dismissed as a part of the Croatization of the 
police force.25  The Croatian government did not commit enough forces to be able to 
                                                 
23 The higher representation of Serbs in government goes back to historical over-representation of 
Serbs throughout the SFRY but more recently was based on a decision by Tito after the Croatian Spring in 
1971, to ensure that Croatian would kept in check by not having a monopoly of power within their republic.  
The “Croatian Spring” had its roots in the 1967 ouster by Tito of Yugoslav Vice President and Interior 
Minister Aleksandar Rankovic who controlled the secret police.  His loss of power set a shock wave 
through Croatia (and Yugoslavia in general) that Serb dominance througth state mechanisms wouldn no 
longer be accepted.  IN 1967, the Croatian Writers Club wrote a declaration on the state of the Croatian 
language, demanding that it no longer be dominatnted by Serbian in a Serbo-Croat language but rather 
become a 4th official language of the SFRY (Macedonian, Serbian and Slovenian were the others).  A furor 
arose in which key Croatian leaders (including Tudjman) were expelled from the party.  This action only 
encouraged reformers whose main complaints were that there were too many Serbs in positions of power in 
Croatia (police, party officials and army officer corps), and that too much money was exported to Belgrade.  
The reform movement grew to include media, students and government leaders.  Tito vacillated on his 
reaction to renewed Croatian nationalism but finally forced the resignation of all reformist leaders, arrest of 
media and student reformers and closure of the businesses that supported reform in December 1971.  The 
JNA played an active role in persuading Tito to crush the Croatian reform movement.  Tanner,   184-202. 
Gow,   24. 
24 Jenkins & Sofos, Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe, London:  Routledge, 1996,   267 
25 Thompson,  270 
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 recapture this region.  In large part, this is because the Croatians were outgunned. 
Martin Špegelj, a retired General who had commanded the 5th Army and was soon 
to become Croatia’s defense minister, had identified the methods the Serbs would use to 
disarm and then defeat Croatia.  In 1990, he developed a plan to arm Croatia.  He began 
to procure arms and to train people, such that by the end of February 1991, Croatia had 
succeeded in mobilizing and training 65,000 lightly armed soldiers.26   
The Serbian plan for Slovenia and Croatia consisted of three phases:  arm the 
Croatian Serbs in the Krajina; fight Slovenia under the guise of “Yugoslav Unity”; and 
conduct a frontal attack of Croatia.27  After Slovenia declared its independence, it seized 
control of the borders with Austria and the JNA barracks in the republic.  The JNA 
moved to fight Slovenia  but were defeated in a ten-day war and afterward, fell back to 
Croatia and BiH.  The lost battle with Slovenia had three consequences for the JNA:  it 
brought about an anger at the inability to defeat Slovene forces; it renewed the JNA’s 
determination to defeat Croatia as the more important of the two rebel republics; and it 
was an opportunity lost by Tuđman to stand with the Slovenes and defeat the JNA in a 
manner that might have saved later invasion. 
In 1991, Serbian irregulars attacked Croatia, Slavonia and the Krajina.  Rebels 
blocked roads and railways, and they broke into police stations and seized weapons.  
Croatian police laid siege to rebel villages.  This gave the JNA the excuse it needed to 
intervene to “stop the conflict from escalating.”28  The JNA used Serb villages and JNA 
barracks as bases to attack Croatian communities.  The JNA would move in to an area 
with paramilitaries in support, forcing Croats and Muslims to flee in front of them.  
Within two months of retreating from Slovenia, the JNA and Serb paramilitaries 
controlled one-third of Croatian territory and rampaged over another third.  They faced 
resistance from some National Guard units that had been reformed and neo-Nazi militias 
(from the Party of the Right) that claimed to have 15,000 men under arms.29 
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 The JNA had no war aim beyond punishing the enemy and surviving in a different 
and diminished form.  It was unleashed without a strategic goal and guided by little more 
than hatred of Croats and fear of the future.  “When General Raseta of the Fifth Army 
District (encompassing Slovenia and part of Croatia) told reporters, in October, that ‘We 
are aware we may lose our lives, but we are sure the republic of Croatia will not 
triumph,’ he summarized the entire strategic wisdom of his Chiefs of Staff.”30 
Špegelj’s efforts however were coming to fruition.  He was able to purchase a 
great number of weapons on the open market despite the arms embargo.  This is because 
of the end of the Warsaw Pact meant that there was a large surplus of arms on the market.  
In addition, the Croatians blockaded the JNA barracks in the country to prevent JNA 
from being able to continue to use them as staging areas.  Eventually, Croatia gained 
control of those barracks, in part due to the help of JNA officers and NCOs who were 
sympathetic to Croatia.  A large number of officers and men from the JNA had left the 
army during its march to Slovenia because they did not see the need to fight an internal 
enemy.  This provided Croatia with a large number of leaders upon which to rebuild an 
army.   
At the end of September, Croatian forces had occupied JNA depots and barracks 
and “acquired 250 tanks, 400-500 heavy artillery pieces, about 180,000 firearms and 
some 2 million tones of ammunition and other military hardware, which brought about a 
fundamental alteration in the balance of military power.”31  Had Croatian forces not been 
able to gain control of these heavy weapons, it is unlikely they could have defeated 
Serbian forces and Croatia would have been reduced to a small sliver of its size. 
F. PARAMILITARIES 
In Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia, paramilitaries played a decisive role 
in the attempted secession from Croatia and the wars of the early to mid 1990s. 
Paramilitaries in Croatia were not as plentiful, but they played a significant role as well.  
The paramilitaries played the same role as others have at various times throughout the 
twentieth century, going back to the Civic Guards, as a part of the Croatian Peasants 
 with the party in the late nineteenth century).  During the Party (which came into being                                                 
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 Second World War, the Ustaše initially relied on the Civic Guards to provide order and 
fight the Partisans.  Even when the Axis allowed the NDH to have an army, the Ustaše 
militia was the most effective unit the NDH had.  This effectiveness was due to its 
ideological indoctrination and devotion to Pavelić.32   
During the wars in the 1990s, there emerged two primary paramilitary 
organizations, the Croat Defense Council (HVO) and the Croat Defense Forces (HOS).  
Croats turned to these irregular units because the Croatian armed forces were initially 
unprepared and outgunned by the Serbs and simply were unable to come to the aid of 
Croat communities. 
The HOS was an extension of the extreme right wing Party of Rights, which had 
been revived by Dobroslav Paraga.  The Party of Rights was a fascist organization and 
HOS was its large paramilitary wing.  Paraga dispatched HOS to fill gaps left by the 
National Guard.  Paraga was also a challenge to Tuđman’s power.  The paramilitary’s 
operations and excesses brought hostile criticism from the foreign press and Paraga 
regularly attacked the HDZ in press briefings.  The HOS provided a large amount of the 
defense of the city of Vukovar explained below.33 
Many Hercegovinian Croats had fought in the war in Croatia in 1991 and became 
seasoned fighters.  After the January 1992 cease-fire they returned to their villages 
knowing that they would have to fight the Serbs again. In April 1992 they established the 
HVO as the military arm of the HDZ in Bosnia.  The HDZ in Bosnia had very close ties 
to the party in Croatia and Tuđman had extraordinary influence in the actions of the HDZ 
in Bosnia.  When the issue of the integrity of the Bosnian state was pressed, Tuđman 
removed the HDZ leader Stjepan Kljuić (who favored a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnian 
state) and replaced him with Mate Boban, a Hercegovinian who sought unification with 
Croatia.  The HVO operated separately from the Bosnian Muslim army and frequently 
found itself at odds with the Bosnian government and its forces.  This animosity and 
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 distrust was exemplified by the creation of a Croat state within Bosnia, the Croat Union 
of Herceg-Bosna.34    
Organized and directed from Zagreb, the HVO was for all practical purposes a 
subordinate command of the HV.  HV General Janko Bobetko directed it through former 
HV officers reassigned to the HVO.  The HVO was operating under HV command 
structure (the HVO main staff was an HV forward command post), Bobetko personally 
selected the first commander, and the HVO chain of command went back to Tuđman in 
Zagreb.35 
The war in Bosnia brought the HVO and the HOS into direct competition for 
power and influence within the Bosnian Croat state.  The specific backing of the HVO by 
Zagreb made the HOS a second tier force among Bosnian Croat militaries.  When the 
rivalry between the groups broke into open confrontation in late summer of 1992, the 
HOS was at a distinct disadvantage that was made even larger by the death of the HOS 
commander and part of his staff in August.  By the end of 1992, the HOS ceased to exist 
as an independent fighting force and it would play no significant role in the remainder of 
the war.36   
Political leaders established the paramilitary organizations to make up for 
shortcomings of the regular army and to allow them more operational freedom.  
Paramilitaries are often willing to commit acts that a regular army will not due to 
ideological unity.  While this statement is not unique to Croatia (in fact it could be 
applied to a large number of states in which paramilitaries have existed), the historical 
and contemporary existence of the paramilitaries, their ties to political parties and the use 
of the paramilitaries to influence events for the sake of the party have influenced the 
ideas concerning the proper role of the military and how a government provides direction 
and oversight.  The use of paramilitaries emphasizes the authoritarian model for civil-
military relations.  
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 G. HOW THE WAR SHAPED THE HV 
There were four key military actions and events that shaped the HV during the 
Homeland War.  The first of these is the Battle of the Barracks, or the strategic offensive 
by the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) and the MUP against the JNA military facilities in 
Croatia.  This effort was needed to try to create some military parity between the two 
forces.  It pushed the war into a new phase, as Zagreb believed that it must close the close 
the gap before Croatia came under direct attack from the JNA.  Prior to the attack the 
ZNG was unable to equip its combat units with the small arms necessary for all of their 
soldiers.  After the attack, the units had a significant amount of heavy weapons with 
which to fight including armor, artillery and mortars.  This also enabled the ZNG to form 
new and larger units that put it on a more level ground to fight the JNA.37  
The Battle of Vukovar was the second important military event for Croatia.38  The 
JNA had plans for a massive armored drive from northern Serbia, past Osijek and west 
across Slavonia to Zagreb and northeastern Croatia.  While Vukovar was only militarily 
significant because the JNA wanted to free its barracks, and it became a focal point 
because the ZNG units and the HOS had fallen back there to regroup after withdrawing 
from an earlier fight.  JNA and Serb paramilitary forces besieged this tiny town in eastern 
Slavonia.  The town became a bastion of the Croatian defense, and it has sometimes been 
referred to as “Croatia’s Stalingrad.”  The battle drew in the great majority of Serb and 
JNA combat forces planned for the main offensive.  The inability of the JNA to seize the 
town from a group of seemingly rag-tag defenders heavily damaged the JNA’s morale 
and prestige.  It also crushed its aura of invincibility, already greatly damaged by the 
short war in Slovenia.  When the JNA had to resort to the used of massed firepower to 
seize the town, it became a public relations disaster, which further isolated Serbia from 
the west.  The battle resulted in the utter destruction of the town, but “Vukovar carried 
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 out its military task extremely well, and in doing so clearly demonstrated that even a 
Serbianized JNA was incapable of resolving the crisis militarily.”39  Vukovar “came to 
symbolize the war itself, highlighting the Croatians’ valiant efforts to break away from 
Yugoslavia and the federation’s determination to stop them by whatever means 
necessary.”40  Vukovar fell on November 19, 1991.  The time the battle took from the 
JNA prevented it from being able to link up with garrisons in Croatia and allowed 
Croatian forces to bring the offensive to a halt.  Vukovar also galvanized Croatians for 
this war. 
The third key event was the siege of Dubrovnik.  Its importance lies in the 
political victory of international recognition and the further demonization of Serb forces 
rather than in military victory for Croatia.  Dubrovnik was a historic tourist town on the 
southern most portion of the Dalmatian coast in Croatia.  It had been a valuable port city 
as well and while JNA and Montenegrin forces isolated the city, they also looted and 
burned it.  Then the JNA fired artillery into the city and destroyed some of the ancient 
architectural and religious buildings and works for which the city was famous.  The 
international press took hold of this story and it further imbedded the idea of an evil 
Yugoslav/Serbian enemy that the Croatian armed forces had to fight against.  The siege 
was eventually broken, in large part due to the international condemnation at the 
destruction of the city’s ancient churches and monuments that brought about international 
diplomatic recognition of Croatia.41 
The fourth key event is the Western Offensive in August and September 1995 
after the HV has been able to build itself up.  This attack was the end of four years of 
frustration for Croatia at military defeat, ethnic cleansing and Serb occupation of 
Croatian land.  As stated previously, the goal of the offensive was to regain the Krajina 
and parts of Central Bosnia that had been controlled by Serbs from previous attacks.  The 
success of this offensive changed the dynamic of the war in Bosnia, led to a window of 
opportunity for diplomatic negotiations that brought about the Dayton Accords and 
provided a significant display of the tremendous improvements that had taken place in 
                                                 
39 Magas & Zanic,   35 
40 CIA,   110. 
41 Tanner,  261-264. 
43
 the fighting abilities and combat readiness of the HV.  Within a period of just under four 
years, the HV had gone from a non-entity to special police units and national guard that 
could delay Serb offensives to a force that could conduct and win fairly large offensive 
campaigns that changed the strategic outlook for peace talks in Bosnia.  These four 
events during the Homeland War were important in shaping the character of the HV. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The Croatian military has been shaped by a cultural history that dates back to the 
1941 establishment of the independent Croatian state.  Axis limitation of and then control 
of the Domobrans led the Ustaše to turn to militia organizations to carry out its military 
will.  They turned first to the Civic Guards of the Croatian Peasants Party and later to the 
Ustaše militia.  The end of the war and Tito’s victory brought an end to the NDH and the 
creation of the JNA formed from the Partisan movement.  The JNA viewed itself as the 
guarantor of Yugoslav sovereignty and became an equal actor in Federation politics with 
the republics.  While the JNA was established as a multi-ethnic organization, Serbs 
gradually dominated it.  The JNA began to play an important role in political decision-
making, as evidenced by their influence on Tito to crush the Croatian Spring of 1971.  
When Tito died, the SFRY lost its cohesion and as republics sought independence, the 
JNA saw its raison d’etre disappearing.  It sought the certainties of nation and mission 
that Tito’s Yugoslavia had provided and believed that Serbia could provide them. 
Upon its creation, the Croatian military quickly assumed an influential role in 
politics that had been played by the military in Croatian during the Second World War 
and that the JNA had played for Tito.  “Unprepared and badly outgunned at the 
beginning, independent Croatia, despite an international arms embargo, gradually built up 
and trained a conventional military force employing Western advisers and, essentially, 
receiving Western encouragement.”42  Tuđman used the military to legitimate his 
regime.  He played upon the nationalistic feelings of a country at war.  The historical and 
contemporary use of militias helped shape the HV into an instrument of the executive 
branch and the HDZ without the component of democratic oversight.  And the waging of 
the Homeland War brought a military maturity to the HV (in the sense that it is a force 
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 that has learned how to be successful and has tasted success) yet continued to allow the 
absence of democratic oversight.  The HV was beginning to play the role for the HDZ 
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 IV. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN CROATIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The path to Croatia’s future lies in the reform of state, economy and government.  
This reform is not limited to the armed forces, but also extends to the entire security 
sector.  Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an idea that has come into being as academics 
have studied countries making transitions to democracy.  They have seen that the 
requirements for democracy go beyond answering the question “who is guarding the 
guardians.”1  The study of post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and post-
authoritarian countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America has shown the tremendous 
importance that the security of a society has on the ability of a state to develop a 
democratic infrastructure and market economy. Security for a democratic state requires 
not simply that the civilian government asserts control over the military, but also that it 
acquire the capacity to oversee a large spectrum of issues within the security sector. 
Security must deal not only with the potential external threats from nation-states but also 
with the internal threats posed by the political or cultural climate and the organizations 
within the state.  
The advantage of thinking in terms of SSR is the ability to look at the problems of 
security in a comprehensive manner.  Taken to its extreme, however, one could easily 
bring so many aspects of society into the security sector as to make it far too broad a field 
to study with any practicable application.  The security sector should be seen along the 
lines that Max Weber identified as a state’s monopoly of the use of legitimate force.2  
This use of force makes the security sector unique, and its direct relationship to the 
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 government makes it answerable to the leaders who are moving toward democratic 
change.  “The security sector of a state may be defined broadly as encompassing those 
elements that have been granted a legitimate and exclusive role in the exercise of 
coercive power in society to deal with external and internal threats to the security of the 
state and its citizens.”3  When a question arises as to whether an organization or aspect of 
reform should be considered within SSR, those two factors (legitimate use of force and 
link to the government) should be seen as the litmus test for determining the factor’s 
relevance.  
Given the legitimate use of force through the auspices of the government, it is 
clear that the security sector deals with more than just the military and a country’s 
Ministry of Defense.  The country’s ministries of Justice and of the Interior, along with 
its border guards, will also fall into the security sector. Armed militias (an important 
consideration as we look at Croatia), if they are affiliated with the state, will also fall into 
this category.  If the militia is not a state formation or is a criminal gang, it falls out of the 
realm of SSR and into one of law enforcement.  Chanaa provides a broad list of possible 
organizations to include:  “military and paramilitary forces; intelligence services; police 
forces, both national and local, together with border guards and customs services; judicial 
and penal systems; and the civil authorities mandated to control and oversee these 
agencies.”4 
SSR deals with a “complex array of organizations, interactions and influences” 
that together affect the relationship between the legitimate use of force by the state and 
“issues of governance and security.”  Its limitations lie in the tendency to group all 
possible issues that affect security (economic success, societal health, etc) into this 
category, making it such a large issue that it is impossible to study.  Security sector 
reform can be thought of as “a holistic means of thinking about issues of security and 
development, and the role that organizations with the ability to utilize force can have on 
them…SSR...provide[s] us with a framework…[but] does not necessarily… target that 
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 thinking.”5  
In examining SSR in Croatia, this chapter will approach the subject 
chronologically, looking at three periods in which the security sector has undergone 
reform.  The first period is made up of the years of the Homeland War, 1991 to 1995.  
Next is the period of authoritarian consolidation under President Tuđman from 1995 to 
2000.  Finally, the current period is one of democratization, beginning with the elections 
of 2000 and continuing to the present.  Within these time frames, four major dimensions 
of SSR must be examined: the political dimension; the institutional dimension; the 
economic dimension; and the societal dimension.  The political dimension of SSR 
examines the nature of the control of the security sector.  The goal is to reach not only 
civilian control but liberal, democratic, civilian control.  That is, a democratic 
government must be able to exercise control over and provide oversight of the security 
sector.  It does this by educating a cadre of officials who are well versed in security 
related issues and are thus able to bring expertise to the ministries of Defense, Interior 
and Justice.  Further, security knowledge must be extended to the parliament (including 
the parliamentary opposition), non-governmental organizations and media, so that proper 
oversight and education can happen within civilian society.6   
The institutional dimension of SSR deals with all state institutions that have 
responsibility for the “safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and 
coercion.”  The reforms necessary here deal with developing the capacities of those 
forces in line with democratic ideals and the standards expected within liberal society.  
This includes choosing the proper size of the military, “disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of excess forces, as well as the building up of forces that are deemed 
insufficient to fulfill their roles.”7  Professionalization of forces, the definition of proper 
roles and missions for military and law enforcement, judicial reform, border security and 
intelligence services all fall within the realms of institutional reform.8 
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 The economic dimension concerns the amount of national resources that the 
security sector requires to perform its duties.  Specific budgeting appropriate for the size 
and missions of the security sector, and the transparency of that budget, are the keys to 
this area.  The societal dimension deals with the role that civil society plays in the 
security sector.  The civil community, media, educational institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, and research and advocacy groups have important roles for civilian 
oversight and ensuring transparency.  These groups provide the additional checks and 
balances that are needed to encourage democratic control of the security sector.9 
After examining each time period and the key dimensions above, the role of the 
international community in creating and reforming the Croatian security sector will be 
examined.  It is important to take into account the effects that international pressure may 
have on helping or damaging the process of SSR in a country.  There are also issues of 
interests and agendas that must be taken into account when looking at donor countries or 
organizations.  Those donors often bring their own concerns that may not be fully in line 
with the goals of the recipient country.  Disagreements over motivations and the 
objectives being sought can only hamper the success of SSR. 
B. THE WAR YEARS 1991-1995 
The Homeland War was a struggle by the newly independent Croatia against 
violence within its borders, at the same time that the state was creating its own army and 
remaking its law enforcement.  The Croatian Armed Forces (HV) were created from 
nearly nothing after the republic declared its independence.  It found itself under attack 
from the much better equipped Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and also fighting a 
Serbian-sponsored secessionist movement of Croatian Serbs and paramilitary 
organizations in Eastern Slavonia and the Krajina. The Croatian leadership, in particular 
the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), sought to quickly build the armed forces to fight 
the Serbs and, in doing so, ensure the armed forces loyalty to the regime. 
1. Political Dimension 
The process of creating the HV from scratch brought about a great deal of 
politicization, because the HV was built upon two pre-existing institutions: the Ministry 
                                                 
9 Chanaa,  30. 
50
 of Interior (MUP) forces and the Territorial Defense Forces (TO).  These had existed in 
the Socialist Republic of Croatia and were responsible to the republic and its government 
rather than to the Yugoslav federal authorities.  In 1991, the MUP created its own units 
“to counter the threats emanating from Serbia and Serbs in Slavonia and Lika.  These 
forces ‘provide those functions that are not possible for the police and which do not fall 
under the general terms of military operations.’”10 The TO had been partially dismantled 
by the federal defense reorganization of the late 1980s and thus was a shadow of its 
former self.  Nevertheless, both organizations had a history and tradition of answering to 
the Croatian republic and its leadership.  As Tuđman continued to make the HDZ the sole 
representative of Croatia and the state’s interests, the HV came to associate very closely 
with the HDZ.11   
As Owen Greene points out: 
The key challenge for democratic control…is not civil control over the 
military, but rather safeguards to prevent misuse of security sector 
agencies by civil political authorities, even if these political authorities are 
now democratically elected…Issues of security sector-civil society 
relations and enhanced parliamentary oversight need to be approached 
from this understanding.12 
This misuse of security sector agencies and lack of parliamentary oversight were both 
hallmarks of the Tuđman regime in Croatia. 
a. Tuđman’s Methods of Control 
Croatia has always had strong, undemocratic civilian control of the 
defense sector, but since the election of President Franjo Tuđman in 1990 it was control 
of an authoritarian type.  Tuđman exercised his control through three main instruments.  
First, he established a chain of command that bypassed Croatia’s constitutional 
provisions for command of the armed forces.   He bypassed those constitutional 
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 provisions by using his executive authority to create a Strategic Decision Council (VSO) 
and also a National Security Committee (SONS).  “The VSO was created in order to 
weaken any dissent from within the regime itself, and provide a veneer of legality to any 
extra-legal decisions by Tuđman.”13  The President appointed all members of the SONS, 
allowing him to avoid any measure of parliamentary oversight.  This created the situation 
in which the HV was answerable to Tuđman alone. 
Tuđman’s second method of control was through the politicization of the 
security sector. He used members of his party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), to 
fill many of the key positions in the military.  This had the effect of encouraging party 
control and military loyalty. HDZ members of parliament held key HV posts, including 
“the Chief of the Supreme Staff, the Commander of the Osijek Military District (equal in 
size to an Army Corps), the head of the Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, 
and the Editor-in-Chief of Hrvatski vojnik, the country’s only military magazine.”  Of 
these, a professional soldier occupied only the first.  Consequently, military promotion 
and assignment to key posts was tied directly to loyalty to the HDZ. Tuđman thus assured 
that the entire chain of command would be politically reliable.14 
The HDZ was also willing to use the HV as a political tool to help 
maintain control of the Sabor.  During the pre-election campaign in the summer of 1992, 
the HDZ emphasized the role the ruling party had in the very creation of the HV.  This 
public campaign was intended to link HDZ legitimacy with battlefield success of the HV.  
In fact, in January 1993, only two weeks before elections to the Upper House of 
Parliament, the HV launched a limited attack against Serb insurgents.  They achieved 
partial success and the offensive was halted 10 kilometers into Serb held territory.  The 
timing of this offensive suggests that some operations were being conducted for political 
benefit of the ruling party and not out of military necessity.  The heavy HV casualties 
from this operation were kept secret for over a year.15 
Through parliam                                                entary procedures, claims of military secrecy and simple  
13 Edmunds,  “Defence Reform in Croatia and Yugoslavia, 2000-03,” 11. 
14 Ozren Zunec, “Democracy in the ‘Fog of War’:  Civil-Military Relations in Croatia,” in Constantine 
Danopolous and Daniel Zirker (eds), Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, 
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996.   224-5. 
15 Zunec,  226. 
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 control of parliament, the HDZ ensured that the Sabor would be unable to debate any HV 
irregularities.  This was done more to represent the HDZ as a ruling party than to protect 
the interests of the HV as an institution.  Through this severe penetration of the HV by 
the ruling party, the HV had become a client of the HDZ.  The danger here lay in a 
military that, because it was completely dependent on a specific political master, was 
more likely to be drawn into committing unprofessional acts.  And “politicized armed 
forces can easily be used to further internal political competition and conflict.”16 
In addition to having extensive control over the HV, Tuđman was able to 
bring the internal security services and intelligence services all under the control of the 
office of the President.  He posted close HDZ allies to the MUP and appointed his son, 
Miroslav Tuđman, to head the intelligence services.  After the Office of National Security 
was placed under presidential control, “all four intelligence organizations, anti-Yugoslav 
Intelligence (OBS), Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance (OSHV), Defence Ministry 
Intelligence (SIS) and Interior Counter Intelligence (UINS), were directly controlled by 
the President.”17 
The third method that Tuđman used to politicize the security sector was 
through payoff incentives or patronage.  In this form of corruption, HDZ members in key 
positions were able to “enrich themselves and gain social prominence as long as they 
towed the party line.”  Investigations since the new coalition government came to power 
have uncovered the distribution of state-owned housing to loyal officers at below market 
prices, embezzlement and fraud of the defense budget, and promotion or shares in 
privatization plans were available for those Tuđman especially trusted.18 
The politicization of the armed forces was intended to help legitimize the 
Tuđman regime.  The HDZ had campaigned on a platform of nationalism and 
independence. The control and loyalty of the HV, the heroes of the Homeland War, made 
a powerful statement that the party continued to imbue the spirit of that nationalism.  
Placing HDZ members in key posts also gave the appearance of civilian control of the 
atic practice. This is not to say that there was not some military, and thus of democr
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 substance to the democracy.  After all, the HDZ did lose control of the Presidency and 
Sabor in the 2000 elections, and the armed forces did not attempt to reverse this result 
2. Institutional Dimension 
In examining the institutional dimensions of the security sector during the war 
years, one must acknowledge that the overriding need for armed forces to defend the 
country limited the steps taken, or even considered, to provide clear guidance for 
professionalization requirements, or to deconflict roles and missions between the HV and 
other security and intelligence services.   
a. Size, Roles and Missions 
With Croatia under the threat of attack, the country needed forces to fight 
against the Serbs.  Even though Tuđman and Špegelj discussed defense issues and how to 
create the armed forces, the overwhelming need to put men into the ranks overcame the 
desire to develop and use a comprehensive plan for the creation of the HV.  The HV 
recruited from all walks of life in Croatia because there was not a large enough pool of 
soldiers from which to draw.  A small cadre of former JNA soldiers did exist and joined 
and there were also Croatian members of the JNA who deserted the army instead of 
fighting against fellow Croats.  Due to the limited size and the initial lack of capabilities 
of the Croatian armed forces, Croatian leadership also resorted to the use of paramilitaries 
to conduct some of the fighting and augment the new force and private contractors to 
help train the new force as noted in chapter III.  The mission of the armed forces was 
very simple, to expel the JNA and Serb paramilitaries and restore the territorial integrity 
of Croatia.  There could be no practical thoughts of going further with a roles and 
missions debate until the security of the state was assured.  In the end, Croatia cobbled 
together a military that was 200,000 troops and made up of 64 brigades.19 
b. Professionalization  
As noted above, Croatia did not have a large pool of soldiers.  This meant 
that recruiting was a reactive process that searched for anyone physically able to meet the 
needs of the armed forces.  Recruitment standards are the first step in ensuring 
professionalism within the military, the relative lack of standards due to necessity meant 
that Croatia was starting in a poor position.  There were a limited number of former 
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 soldiers available, but they were established as unit cadres to help develop a chain of 
command.  There was no military education system in existence.  All of those facilities 
had been maintained at the federal level in Yugoslavia.  There was a significant 
politicization of officer billets and key community figures (and HDZ supporters) were 
made high-ranking officers out of a need for senior officers despite a lack of military 
experience.  This patronage led to further politicization of the armed forces.  In summary, 
Croatia had limited resources, equipment, materials, budget and qualified personnel.  The 
need for a force of the size necessary to meet the JNA and Serb paramilitaries superceded 
the acknowledged need for a system of professionalism. 
3. Economic Dimension 
The immediate nature of the creation of the Croatian armed forces did not allow 
for a careful evaluation of the strategic goals for the defense of the nation nor for a debate 
about the resources that would be devoted to defense.  While it is certainly reasonable 
that the regime’s first priority was to ensure the existence of the newly independent 
republic, the Tuđman government took steps that “created a non-democratic culture 
within the HV and the defence ministry that persisted long after the threat had 
disappeared across the Danube.”20 
a. Resources and Budget Transparency  
The covert arms purchases made necessary by the arms embargo 
established over the whole of Yugoslavia in 1991 strengthened the non-democratic 
culture.  General Martin Špegelj was in charge of the weapons procurement and he found 
willing sellers in Germany and among elements of the Soviet Army.  He spent some $400 
million, money that was never accounted for, buying arms.  This established a precedent 
that procurement policy was conducted beyond democratic scrutiny.  It also blurred the 
lines of civilian control since Špegelj balanced between the world of party, state and 
military.21  This secrecy allowed Croatia to begin significant operations in Bosnia 
without the Sabor authorizing or performing any portion of oversight.  It was also 
through this web of secrecy that financial and weapons support was established for the 
HVO.  This support was crucial in allowing the HVO (and later the HV) to fight Serbs in 
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 Bosnia. Thus Croatian defense spending had no oversight and there was no budget 
transparency.  Špegelj used government funds to procure weapons and he also used funds 
sent from the Croatian Diaspora.  This allowed no mechanism for true oversight even if 
the Sabor or another organization would have been in a position to do it. 
4. Societal Dimension 
During this period, civil society was not heavily involved in the security sector 
except for the obvious role of providing the men and women as soldiers and policemen.  
In this relative societal vacuum, the key player within civil society was the organized 
crime element.  As identified above, corruption and patronage played key roles in the 
politicization of the HV.  This is in part due to some of the historical influences written of 
in chapter three.  The need for absolute loyalty within nationalist political parties has the 
tendency to bring to power a small group of people.  When that political party gains 
power and has to fill the bureaucratic offices of government it relies on people who are 
indoctrinated in its ideology.  Those like-minded people are often family or very close 
friends because they are the only ones who are fully trusted to carry out the plan.  That 
brings into nepotism and patronage to the highest levels of government.  It also means 
that this personal trust is the most important issue amongst leadership and that there is 
little oversight provided to prevent the misuse and abuse of power. The existence of 
paramilitary wings in political parties created another vehicle for patronage and also for 
enforcement of the ways of the party.  The paramilitaries provided a more palatable 
employment option for many people than other forms of labor.  These paramilitaries lead 
to the development of an insidious form of organized crime that was highly connected 
within government, the military and society.  The leaders of the organizations were 
influential with political leaders and often contributors of money, resources and personnel 
that helped get politicians and parties elected.  Their origins as militias also meant that 
these criminal organizations were very well armed.  The influence of these criminal 
organizations is, along with veterans’ organizations, an obstacle to cooperation with the 
ICTY. 
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 C. AUTHORITARIAN CONSOLIDATION 1995-2000 
During the post-war Tuđman years, Croatia became “the showcase of ‘tyrannical 
majority’ in democratic transition.”22  When free multi-party elections were held in 
Croatia, they were held as proof positive for the strength of the democratic institutions 
there.  But what was actually occurring was  
not democracy, but democratic centralism, since once a decision was 
brought by the majority of the votes, it must be universally observed 
without demur, and there is no follow-up to the democratic procedure.  
The democratic part is realized and concluded by the vote.  After the vote, 
centralism takes over…To reduce democracy in Croatia to free multi-party 
elections is to apply the logics of democratic centralism to the entire 
society.23 
While western countries viewed the Tuđman dictatorship with increasing 
wariness little seemed to be done concretely to get him to change his behavior.  Despite 
“repeated warnings, the Croatian leadership has not complied with the internationally 
accepted rules of democracy.  The ambivalent Western behaviour towards Croatia has 
been expressed in the matter of its membership of the Council of Europe:  Croatia was to 
be admitted as a full member in 1996, then this admission was postponed because of the 
continued violations of political and human rights.”24 
1. Political Dimension 
After the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia following the Dayton Peace 
Agreements, the HV took on a more obvious role in domestic politics.  The HV became 
even more highly politicized.  While neither the HV nor other security services physically 
intervened in domestic politics, they were often used to legitimize the regime.  “The 
politicization of the security and defense structures during the Tuđman period was not the 
result of Croatia’s legal framework for civil-military relations.  It stemmed from an 
underdeveloped political culture on the part of the political decision-makers and an 
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 absence of professional ethics on the part of the soldiers.”25Highly placed HDZ officials 
within the MoD, when confronted by military officers who disagreed, often resolved 
those disagreements by dismissing of prominent military professionals who expressed 
differing opinions than those of the regime.26   
The HDZ also used the military to create powerful lobbying interests that would 
provide “independent” views on the direction of government or military issues.  The most 
significant of these groups is the Croatian Veterans' Association (HVIDRA).  “During 
this period of consolidation, HVIDRA publicly defended the regime whenever it was 
criticized by the international community or opposition parties.  This served to legitimate 
the constant refusal to cooperate with the ICTY or fulfill international demands for the 
return of Serbian refugees to Croatia.”  By using HVIDRA, the Tuđman regime was able 
to greatly influence Croatian public opinion so that they disapproved of the ICTY’s 
activities and believed that it should not have jurisdiction to investigate the alleged war 
crimes.27 
After the war ended, Tuđman sought to identify any opposition to the HDZ as 
being anti-Croatian and a threat to the peace and stability of the country.  In 1995, 
elections in Zagreb should have brought to power a mayor from the opposition, but 
Tuđman used his emergency powers to block that candidate and instead install a HDZ 
loyalist.  Tuđman justified this move as necessary to prevent a candidate that would bring 
instability to Zagreb.  “The message here is unmistakable.  Not only is an attack on the 
HDZ an attack on the Croatian state, but the President insisted that opposition could not 
be allowed, implying the coercion could be used to suppress the opponents of the 
HDZ.”28 
While the HV was not used to intervene in domestic politics, the MUP and 
intelligence forces were.  “MUP forces were used to suppress protests and curtail the 
activities of the media.  The intelligence services were deployed in a similar fashion.”  In 
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 fact, the use of these forces within domestic politics was so great that even members of 
the HDZ were targeted.  In 1998, the defense minister, Andrija Hebrang, discovered that 
the SIS had been wire tapping his phones and were actively trying to undermine him.  He 
was at odds with Tuđman because he was a moderate member of the HDZ, and he sought 
to balance the defense ministry’s budget and bring the ministry out of heavy debt.  When 
a party hearing cleared the SIS of any wrong doing, Hebrang resigned in protest.29   
2. Institutional Dimension 
a. Promotion.   
Due to political penetration, the promotion system was heavily politicized 
such that HDZ interests were represented at every level in the promotion system.  This 
created a promotion system filled with political patronage and clientalism.  These factors, 
when combined with a tendency to promote officers and appoint them to key staff 
positions on the basis of battlefield success, led to a top-heavy military bureaucracy that 
lacked the necessary expertise for staff work and necessary reform.   
Croatia’s defense and security bureaucracies were closed institutions.  The 
lack of an objective system for career development and ensuring objective career records 
denied the MoD the ability to review of an officer’s competence to hold a key position on 
the General Staff or in the MoD.  These issues combine to severely limit the effectiveness 
of the personnel system to assign the right person to the needed job.  This then 
contributes to those key positions being dominated by patronage.  Promotions within the 
HV generally were granted through HDZ affiliations, or through battlefield experience 
gained at an operation level during the war.  Since Tuđman’s death, many of these 
practices persist and have become some of the most persistent barriers to long-term 
reform.  These methods of promotion lead to the dual problems of officers being 
appointed to positions in the MoD that require education and experience that they simply 
don’t have to effectively fill that billet.  Secondly, promotion through battlefield success 
tends to make it nearly impossible to have objective career records and performance 
evaluations, thus making it extremely difficult for the administration to properly choose 
an officer that is best suited for a particular position. 30  
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 3. Economic Dimension 
The economic dimension of SSR during authoritarian consolidation continued the 
same patterns as had been established during the war years.  There was no budgetary 
oversight from any agency.  Budget transparency was an illusion.  And patronage through 
a system of payoffs for HDZ loyalists continued. 
4. Societal Dimension  
Croatian society had a difficult time trying to create SSR in the societal 
dimension.  Tuđman had co-opted the civil community by continuing to use security 
forces to enhance his legitimacy.  The HDZ had control of all of the media in Croatia, 
having been placed there through a system of cronyism.  As explained above, veterans 
organizations acted as apologists for the HDZ policies, limiting their ability to provide 
oversight to those government policies.   Tuđman was unable to fully consolidate his 
power in the societal dimension and dissent did exist, though it moved underground.  The 
best evidence for this is the opposition victory at the polls in 2000. 
D. DEMOCRATIZATION 2000-2003 
1. Political Dimension 
Since assuming power in 2000, the government of Prime Minister Ivan Račan has 
faced the problem of trying to depoliticize the armed forces.  By depoliticizing, they must 
neutralize “HDZ influence within the Croatian defence sector and [implement] a 
restructuring process to consolidate its mechanisms for democratic control of the 
military.”  While it has not been an entirely smooth process, it is notable that “for all its 
politicization and penetration by the HDZ regime, the HV remained in its barracks during 
Croatia’s political transition.” 31   
The problem of depoliticization rests as well in identifying a strategy to rid the 
HV of the influence of the HDZ without spreading the perception of repoliticizing the 
armed forces.  Upon coming to office as Defense Minister in 2000, Jožo Radoš began 
with two techniques to purge the MoD of the HDZ.  First, he fired seven deputy defense 
ministers stating: 
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 We intend to discontinue the practice of political activity within the 
Croatian Army…officers and civil servants within the Ministry of Defence 
will be allowed to belong to political parties but not to hold party 
functions.  Our aim is to have experts in key positions of the Ministry of 
Defence.32 
His second step was to audit the finances of the ministry.  As stated earlier, one of the 
methods that Tuđman had used to maintain the loyalty of HDZ officials in the MoD was 
to allow them to gain financially from their postings.  The military budget had not been 
fully disclosed and, in fact, a large part of it remained classified.  This was not due to 
military necessity but rather due to corruption.  “Much of this classified 
expenditure…was spent supporting the activities of political appointees rather than core 
defence activities.”  An audit of MoD vehicles found that the ministry owned 2,300 cars 
while the armed forces only required 200-300.33 
A key event that shows both the extent of HDZ influence in the officer corps and 
the commitment to the process of de-politicization in the current Croatian government 
occurred in September 2000.  The government, acting in support of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), arrested 12 suspects (including two 
HV generals) on suspicion of war crimes.  The HDZ encouraged opposition to the 
government within the HV, and twelve general officers wrote an open letter to the 
government critical of its policies and accusing it of slandering of war heroes.  President 
Mesić reacted swiftly to remove each of those generals from service and ensuring the 
primacy of civilian control of the armed forces.  Concerning his actions, Mesić said that 
“whoever wants to be in politics has the right to do so…But while they are in the army 
they will not be publishing pamphlets.”  Mesić was very clear that the armed forces must 
be depoliticized.34   
a. ICTY and Opposition from HVIDRA 
Another key part of cooperating with the ICTY has been the contentious 
issue of turning over the former Chief of Staff General Janko Bobetko.  Bobetko had 
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 been indicted on charges of war crimes committed by his troops during the Homeland 
War; however, the Croatian people see him as a war hero and repeated polls have shown 
their reluctance to see him turned over to the tribunal.  President Mesić initially came out 
strongly against turning over Bobetko to the ICTY, to the displeasure of Europe and the 
United States.  He softened his stance slightly by saying that the 81-year-old general was 
too sick to stand trial, a position supported by doctors reporting to the ICTY. Bobetko’s, 
death in May 2003 rendered the issue moot, but the problem will come alive again as the 
ICTY calls for other former HV officers to be held accountable for war crimes.  Mesić 
will have to choose between cooperating with the international community, and 
potentially losing the political support necessary for re-election, or refusing to hand over 
accused war criminals, a stance that polls say is backed by a majority of the Croatian 
people.  The HDZ has made this an important political issue and will attempt to use any 
miss-step from the government to ride back into power.  An option that may provide 
some political cover for the government is shown in the recent trial of a former army 
General Mirko Norac and three other defendants in a Croatian court.  The government 
negotiated with the ICTY to have jurisdiction on these cases and the jailing of three of the 
four defendants seemed to prove a great deal about the credibility of the Croatian 
judiciary and its ability to handle such cases.35 
The influence of the HDZ through HVIDRA also continues to be a 
problem for the current government.  While HVIDRA acted as an apologist for the HDZ 
while it was in power, it has disrupted and criticized the coalition government of Prime 
Minister Račan.  For instance during the summer of 2000, in protest for the government’s 
proposal that all veterans receive the same pension, HVIDRA members blocked roads 
and harassed shipping.  The ideology behind this was that HVIDRA would not allow 
veterans of the Homeland War to be lumped into the same category as veterans of the 
Second World War, which would include people who had been Partisans under Tito. 
There is continued concern over the politicization of the armed forces 
even within the current government.  President Stipe Mesić was elected on a platform 
that pledged to reduce presidential power.  He has been slow to take the necessary steps.  
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 In fact, instead of consulting Defense Minister Radoš (a member of a different political 
party), he imposed his own choice for Chief of Staff.  Several months later, a member of 
Radoš’ party tried to undermine this decision by suggesting that he had been invited by 
the ICTY to provide evidence implicating Mesić’s choice for Chief of Staff in war 
crimes.36  Even as government’s change and democracy takes hold, the temptation to 
make appointments for high offices part of a political game is high.  
b. Constitutional Problems 
The civilian chain of command is problematic.  The President is head of 
state and nominates the Prime Minister to create a government.  The Prime Minister 
chooses the cabinet including the Defense Minister, through whom the President exerts 
his power as commander in chief.  If a conflict exists between the Defense Minister and 
the President, the President can ask parliament to dismiss the minister through the use of 
a no confidence vote on the Defense Minister.37 From that moment until parliament has 
reached a decision, the president can command the armed forces directly through the 
Chief of the General Staff.    
The president is unable, constitutionally, to propose laws to parliament 
regarding any issues.  This is particularly important in the areas for which he is 
constitutionally responsible: security, defense, foreign affairs and intelligence.  This 
creates a gap between the responsibility of the president in dealing with these issues, and 
the authority necessary to act effectively.  Obviously it is important that the president and 
ministers of defense, foreign affairs and interior are able to work together for the sake of 
SSR.  This constitutional problem is one that leaders must work through despite the 
system instead of working within the system. 
2. Institutional Dimension 
a. New Strategic Context  
Croatia recognizes that the country is living within a new strategic context.  
The threat of invasion from Serbia and Montenegro is no longer the pre-eminent security 
concern.  The issues that are in the forefront are downsizing the HV, the shrinking 
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 defense budget, the need for cooperation between the MoD and the Ministry of Interior 
and the professionalization of the force.  All security issues are now viewed in the context 
of partnership with NATO, and of providing forces for peace support operations beyond 
the territorial confines of Croatia.  To create such a force, one of the first items to review 
is the size of armed forces.  Croatia’s armed forces, currently at 51-53,000 are far too 
large to be sustainable for the reduced threat and the desire for modernization.  Figures 
for right sizing identify 20-25,000 as the target size for the HV.  There are great political 
risks for downsizing and HVIDRA again shows its influence in this arena.  Croatia has 
been fighting a high unemployment rate.  Putting an additional 20,000 to 30,000 people 
out of work through downsizing could be very damaging politically for the government. 
The professionalism of the HV is a key issue, and is currently being 
addressed in a couple of ways: first through the expansion of professional military 
education (PME); second through recruiting, which includes a reconsideration of the 
future of conscription.  Through PME, Croatia can shape the officers currently in their 
ranks and provide them the knowledge and expertise necessary to deal with issues such as 
modernization, transparency and downsizing that will define the future of the HV.  Bi-
lateral agreements have allowed for the training abroad of many officers in Western 
Europe or North America.  The recruiting process is central to the ability to 
professionalize.  The higher the quality of individuals that a country can bring into 
service, the better that service will be.  Force reduction necessarily brings into question 
the requirement for conscription, and different variants of all-volunteer or pre-dominantly 
volunteer force have been examined. 
b. Modernization and Restructuring 
As a part of that challenge to move beyond the wartime and authoritarian 
concept of security threats, brings about the need to restructure and modernize.  An audit 
conducted in 2000 found that more than two-thirds of defense spending was on 
personnel.  Those costs reflect the considerable manpower and the high level of 
conscription within the HV.  The high level of spending on personnel issues allows very 
little money to be available for equipment modernization.  The necessary money for 
modernization must be freed from personnel obligations.  Proposals to allow re-allocation 
of funds include reducing the compulsory service from ten to six months and cutting the 
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 professional soldiers by one-third (9000 to 6000).  These strategies would cut the overall 
force by one-third, thus freeing some money.  Other reform ideas include consolidating 
the operational centers to gain some economy of scale; a military education system linked 
to civilian education; pay and retirement reform; and improving soldiers’ quality of life.  
The defense support of the United States and the PfP program has been considerable in 
helping these issues.  The United States even donated several F-16s to Croatia to aid in 
the modernization of the Croatian air force.38 
3. Economic Dimension 
The Croatian security sector is working within an era of shrinking budgets and 
increased demand for accountability.  The troubled state of the Croatian economy with 
high unemployment and only recently recovering from the downturn in tourism suffered 
from the wars in the Balkans, demand that the security sector be extremely good stewards 
of the funds to which they are entrusted.  Croatia must deal with the legacy of high 
defense spending and how that has colored the view of officials who work within the 
procurement departments.  The bureaucratic memory of available money or “slush funds” 
is hard to defeat until you have undergone training and grown past that generation of 
bureaucrats.  As noted, a very large percentage of spending is on personnel for pay or 
pensions.  The most direct route to gaining back the resources needed for modernization 
and restructuring is to reallocate from personnel to research and development or 
procurement.  However, domestic politics gets in the way and the public is very 
concerned about ensuring that the government fulfills its moral responsibility to the 
soldiers who defended the country from conquest or destruction by the Serbs.  
4. Societal Dimension  
Within civil society there are few instances of active interest in security affairs, 
apart from intense public scrutiny of Veterans Affairs, which includes a concern that the 
government, while reducing the armed forces, pays proper respect to those who have 
served.  This has led to parliamentary and public resistance to the reform agenda.  “In a 
dynamic political transition, parliaments often become a last bastion for representatives 
of the ‘old order’.  In the short term, strengthening parliamentary control and oversight 
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 may empower those who are determined to block desirable SSR.”39  The HDZ 
manipulation of the ICTY for political purposes distinctly shows this.  There is also 
considerable public misunderstanding of NATO political requirements, which hampers 
the government’s ability to get its true intentions into the open where they can be 
reviewed. 
There is a lack of civilian society engagement and expertise on defense matters in 
Croatia, overall.  For civilian oversight to work, there must be a cadre of people who 
have a working (and sometimes more detailed) knowledge of the problems that occur in 
the security sector and who have educated themselves concerning the issues. Since 2000, 
civil society engagement in defense has expanded.  There have been a series of courses 
developed to help enlarge the pool of applicants who are able to provide knowledgeable 
oversight of the security sector inside and outside government.  The next challenge 
becomes recruiting people to attend the courses and developing the civic mindset 
necessary to make people aspire to such tasks. 
E. ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The problems in the Balkans, and in other conflict torn areas around the world, 
require assistance from the international community to provide guidance, manpower, 
expertise, financing and security.  In Croatia the incentives for internal reform come from 
its desire to join international organizations such as the North Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union, as well as from the international demand that it comply with the ICTY.  
These motivations for change fall into the categories of defense assistance and 
conditionality.  Defense assistance has come in the form of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation focusing on security reform. "Conditionality is most easily defined as the 
policies or conditions that a country is asked to fulfill, either explicitly or implicitly, 
before it is accepted as a candidate or member of NATO" or other international 
organizations.40  
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 1. Defense Assistance 
During the Tuđman era, the United States was heavily involved in providing 
security assistance to Croatia.  This occurred indirectly at first, through the use of a 
private military company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI).  Even 
though it was essentially outsourcing this service, there were many ties between MPRI 
and the U.S. government through the used of retired military personnel and they had the 
support and approval for their activities in Croatia from the State Department.  MPRI’s 
license prohibited them from providing a tactical component to the training they gave the 
Croatians so as not to violate the 1991 UN arms embargo.41 While it has been working 
with the Croatians, MPRI has developed and implemented four separate programs to help 
modernize and reform the HV.  These programs are: the Republic of Croatia Democracy 
Transition Assistance Program (DTAP); the Republic of Croatia Democracy Transition 
Long-Range Management Program (LRMP); the Republic of Croatia Army Readiness 
Training System (CARTS) Program; and the Croatian-MPRI Program.  DTAP is a multi-
year program to provide leadership and management training for the HV.  It also led to a 
review of the professional military education system.  LRMP focused on developing a 
national military strategy, and on long-range defense planning and policy formulation.  
CARTS built upon the DTAP and LRMP to create a system to analyze, evaluate, and 
validate readiness throughout the army.  Finally, the Croatian-MPRI program assisted 
and supported the MoD and the General Staff in meeting the requirements outlined 
within Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO membership, and in preparing the military 
to engage in peace support operations.42 
MPRI allowed the United States to engage Croatia at a time when more direct 
links were difficult due to the authoritarian nature of the Tuđman regime.  This 
engagement allowed the United States to show support for Croatia against the aggression 
of Milosević’s Serbian forces and to attempt to limit the destabilization of the Balkans.  
Although the use of a private security contractor provided the United States flexibility in 
supporting Croatia within the framework of applicable UN resolutions, there are many 
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 concerns about privatizing security sector reform.  Can a private company ensure the 
requirements of international law are maintained while working with the client state that 
is fighting for its survival?  Many critics say that MPRI actually set back the development 
of the democratic process in the Croatian military.  They believe that the technocratic 
solutions offered by such groups give the impression of great change due to 
organizational differences while they lack the change in attitude and impression 
necessary to reform an organization.  Critics also point to the success of the HV in 1995 
and say that the success is due to MPRI training that exceeded its mandate and did 
conduct tactical training.  There is also the question of whether an organization that is 
staffed and led by retired military personnel is best suited to assist in depoliticizing the 
military in order to assure democratic accountability and transparency.43   
Since the Dayton accords, the United States has been able to provide more direct 
support to Croatia including through the International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) program, which superceded the assistance that MPRI had previously given.  
IMET funding to Croatia grew from $65,000 in 1995 to $500,000 in 2000 and the total 
over that period was about $2 million.  Despite being a relatively small investment for the 
United States, this assistance has allowed Croatia to restructure its armed forces to meet 
peacetime needs.  Croatia has established four goals for its foreign training programs:  
develop a civil-military system that ensures the proper role for the military in civil 
society; a professionally trained military capable of sustaining its own training; an 
effective, efficient resource management system; and complete system interoperability 
with NATO.  To reach these goals with IMET, the Croatians have established their 
training priorities:  senior level schooling; strategic planning and policy; defense systems 
planning and procedures; and training and doctrine.  “The IMET Program in Croatia is 
regarded by many as the most significant and successful U.S. and Croatian engagement 
tool…The Croatians support the IMET program with two dollars of their money for 
every dollar dedicated to it by Congress….[which] has effectively tripled the size of their 
program, making it one of the largest in Europe.”44   
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 Since 1995, more than 300 Croatian students have traveled to the United States 
and hundreds more have been trained through Mobile Education and Training Teams 
(METTs) that have visited Croatia.  The program has touched every sector of the general 
staff and ministry of defense.  Croatian soldiers have used this training as a catalyst for 
changes within the armed forces for traditional military skills and resource management 
as well.  IMET has also heavily supported English language training, which is a major 
Croatian objective toward the accession to NATO under the Membership Action Plan.  
The English language facilities that have been built and the faculty that is staffed with 
IMET funding are capable of producing 150 fluent English speakers annually.  The 
United States also supports other programs such as the Marshall Center in Garmisch, 
Germany for higher security and defense learning where Croatia has sent more than 40 
members of its MoD and general staff for training.  The U.S. Office of Defense 
Cooperation and the U.S. Agency for International Development contribute money and 
training for humanitarian assistance, helping provide the infrastructure necessary for 
Croatian forces to rebuild from the devastation that remains from the war years. 45 
These programs, in conjunction with German and British programs have greatly 
helped move the HV toward the standard expected that allowed consideration from 
NATO for Croatia to become a partner within PfP and to then be invited to the 
Membership Action Plan.  Part of this success was due to the United States and other 
Allies holding Croatia responsible for making good use of the personnel that they send to 
be educated.  This means that they are posted to jobs within the MoD, or other ministry, 
where they can take their expertise and use it for the benefit of the Croatian armed forces 
and the country as a whole.  These are programs that continue to pay dividends. 
2. NATO Opportunities 
The opportunities that cooperation with NATO and admittance to the PfP and 
MAP have provided for Croatia are extremely important.  These programs include 
military exercises with NATO members and partners, military education opportunities 
such as language training, military education seminars, and resident professional 
education in military schools in Alliance member countries.   The increased coordination 
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 with member militaries gives the HV goals toward which to move in terms they can 
recognize, rather than simply as goals stated in documents. 
Croatia has participated as often as possible in PfP sponsored exercises and 
missions to prove that they will be a strong member country.  They have done this by 
providing personnel and support for United Nations peacekeeping missions in Sierra 
Leone, Eritrea and Ethiopia.  The HV has used the positive feedback from these missions 
to raise its international profile as a force that actively contributes to peacekeeping and 
international security.  These missions also give Croatia the opportunity to show the 
progress that it is making toward compliance with NATO standards.  In 2002, Croatia 
also hosted the PfP sponsored regional fire fighting exercise “Taming the Dragon.”  The 
success of the exercise provided another example of Croatia’s desire for membership.  
Numerous bilateral exercises with U.S. forces have also provided opportunities for 
education and learning techniques, tactics and procedures necessary for interoperability.46  
3. Conditionality 
Conditionality has been an important part of NATO's expansion since the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe began to desire membership.  That membership 
would be conditional on each country's progress toward political, economic and military 
reforms as spelled out in the 1995 NATO Enlargement Study. The criteria are general 
and not specific47, however, so progress is sometimes difficult to assess. The models 
offered by member countries are not consistent, and there is no single measure of 
effectiveness.  And finally, "NATO as an organisation was hardly equipped to judge 
levels of democratisation, unlike, for example, the Council of Europe."48 
The greatest specificity is available in the area of defense, where NATO has a 
great deal of expertise and there are specific measures of effectiveness that can be used to 
evaluate results.  PfP has been helpful in moving partners in the direction of reforms, and 
in providing assistance.  PfP does not, however, impose strict conditionality, since 
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 participants choose the areas they work on and the pace at which they progress.  The 
MAP has been a considerable improvement in identifying the necessary reforms for 
membership and establishing a more achievable plan for assessing progress. With MAP, 
"conditionality became much more explicit and specific." Among other countries, Croatia 
was required to fulfill a series of tasks prior to entering PfP and becoming a part of MAP 
because "the international community has seen their quest for membership as a lever to 
bring about internal reforms and changes of policy that will help stabilise the region and 
in particular, hold together the Dayton accords." 49 
Conditionality has been used for four purposes with Croatia.  The first is to 
encourage the government to "get its house in order."  In other words, put democratic 
institutions and practices in place, ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights -- 
including cooperation with the ICTY.  The second purpose is to encourage friendly and 
stable relations with neighboring countries.  The continuing support and implementation 
of the Dayton accords belongs in the area.  Next is for Croatia to contribute to peace 
support operations and participate in PfP exercises by way of preparation for 
membership.  Finally, conditionality has been used to get the armed forces to move away 
from its isolated, politicized, unaccountable past and toward a future with a reformed HV 
under democratic control.50  
Pre-conditionality has been used most often with Croatia, in order to insure that it 
actually meets the membership criteria of NATO before being invited to join.  While 
acknowledging the positive effect pre-conditionality has had on moving Croatia toward 
reform, it is important to understand the obstacles that it presents.  Its influence may 
ultimately be limited regarding politically sensitive issues.  This is particularly the case in 
dealing with the ICTY and trying to force a politically fragile government to make this 
policy work and explain it to a public that “remains largely ill-informed about the 
requirements of NATO accession and defence reform.”  The second obstacle is that pre-
conditionality’s success is dependent on the Croatian government being in favor of 
membership in NATO.  The current government is strongly in favor, the opposition is 
using NATO pressure as a campaign tactic against the current cabinet with the next 
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 elections in 2004.  “Under these circumstances, making and implementing hard decisions 
over pre-conditionality reform goals may become increasing problematic.”  Finally, there 
is the fear that pre-conditionality focused on specific targeted reforms will not take into 
account the holistic nature of SSR that is its essence.  In so doing, Croatia could point to 
specific successes that it has made without even dealing with larger systemic problems.51  
Direct conditionality “has taken the form of threats to withdraw incentives from 
or inflict punitive measure on [a] state if [it does] not implement particular policies or 
obligations.”52  It can also be characterized as being imposed upon a country from 
outside. The explicit use of direct conditionality has been limited with Croatia, but it has 
certainly played a role with the ICTY.  Tuđman’s obstruction of the ICTY contributed to 
Croatia’s exclusion from institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the Central 
European free trade Association (CEFTA), PfP and the EU’s PHARE aid program.53  
The current government’s declaratory policies concerning the importance of NATO and 
EU membership, which includes cooperation with the ICTY, made Croatian entry into 
international organizations possible.  Croatia joined PfP in May 2000, the WTO in 
November 2000, MAP in May 2002 and CEFTA in March 2003.54  
Conditionality may also provide political cover for a government that is under 
domestic pressure.  Owen Greene suggests that “the broad incentives associated with 
reforms that move a country towards closer association with EU and NATO are generally 
more flexible than the term ‘conditionality’ usually implies.  It is more appropriate…to 
insist on due process in decision making (including appropriate inter-ministerial and 
parliamentary review and wide consultation) than it is for them to attempt to direct the 
specific content of the reforms.’55  In other words, the ability to work directly with 
decision makers and the creation of institutions, which provide democratic transparency 
and accountability, may be the condition that is truly required, even if the results are not 
immediate. 
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 There are dangers associated with conditionality.  It can distort a country's 
policies in an effort to please outsiders.  A country may alter domestic spending 
priorities, allocating more money to defense out of a desire to quickly meet NATO 
requirements. This altered spending may distort a country's progress towards a market 
economy.56  Even within the defense budget, conditionality may lead to decisions 
concerning weapons systems or recruitment designed solely in order to appeal to alliance 
interests.  At the same time, the public may come to believe that changes (and 
accompanying hardships) are being forced upon them by external pressures divorced 
from domestic conditions.  A great deal of resentment can build and lead to an opposition 
movement that plays to nationalist tendencies and reasserts the independence of the 
country.  This is very similar to the tactics that the HDZ is currently using to try to take 
support away from the coalition government.57 
F. THE PATH AHEAD 
1. Expanding Civilian Oversight Capacity 
The only true method for gaining true reform is to empower the people of the 
country where reform is needed.  Croatians must want to make the reforms work and then 
set about putting them into effect.  Now that reform has begun it is important to continue 
to expand the oversight capacity of Croatians throughout the society.  This is necessary 
so that the public debate over security issues can be expanded and the level of expertise 
can rise.  The dialogue and debate must also take into account methods for monitoring the 
reform and periodic evaluations to ensure that it continues on the correct path.  This 
exists currently with the PARP between Croatia and NATO, but it would also be valuable 
within the country itself.  Additional methods for helping engage society include practical 
courses in security studies and administration in the universities; exchange visits between 
Croatian and foreign legislators to discuss parliamentary committee; and the training of 
civilian defense experts.58  These steps have been taken in Croatia as the University of 
Zagreb has created undergraduate and graduate level courses to train civilians in defense 
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 management and the security sector, in addition to the training that Croatians continue to 
receive through the IMET program.  Exchange visits have been a part of PARP and the 
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe of which Croatia is a part and also at the recent Ohrid 
Regional Conference on Border Security and Management.59 
2. Managing Corruption 
Croatia has also understood the danger that corruption and organized crime can 
pose to its reform efforts.  Anton Tus has identified Croatia’s main security challenges as 
being terrorism, organized crime and mass migration.  These concerns all relate to high 
levels of unemployment and instability.60  In an unstable environment, there is a greater 
likelihood of corruption and a return to the system of patronage described above.  The 
key within the security sector is to identify and progressively eliminate the pockets of 
power that exist beyond the government.61  This is something that the Račan government 
has had some success in accomplishing and there is reason to be optimistic for further 
success.  The Croatian administration and President Mesić have recently conducted a 
number bilateral and multi-lateral talks to bring a regional approach to stopping 
organized crime and corruption, and also purging the police force to rid it of corruption.62 
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 G. CONCLUSION 
Security Sector Reform is vital to securing Croatia’s future as an integral partner 
with the rest of Europe.  The political legacy of the Tuđman regime created a highly 
politicized military.  This happened due to the creation of the HV based on organizations 
that had been responsible to the state and party (TO and MUP), and through a strategy of 
penetration and corruption at the highest levels of the MoD. The circumstances of war 
allowed for much of this initially to be done without much opposition.  After the war, 
Tuđman embarked on a period of consolidation that cemented the framework he had 
established in order to help legitimize the regime.  The post-Tuđman era of 
democratization has been marked by de-politicization, greater transparency in decision-
making, and a focus on properly shaping the force for the new strategic context. 
In the early 1990’s, Croatia was faced with creating an armed force from virtually 
nothing.  The result was a very large mobilized force that lacked professionalism and 
expertise.  SSR has led to a strong emphasis on professionalization, downsizing and 
modernization.  The key pieces to this have been a change of roles and missions 
established in the National Security Strategy of 2002. 
Weapons procurement in Croatia began as an attempt to arm the country while 
bypassing the UN weapons embargo on Yugoslavia.  The secretive nature of this program 
was the starting point for defense expenditures that were kept out of the public eye.  
There was no oversight provided from the Sabor and certainly no budget transparency.  
This led to a blank check mentality that brought the ability for Croatia to undertake 
operations without Sabor authorization or oversight.  The movement toward NATO has 
pushed Croatia toward much greater fiscal accountability and budget transparency.  The 
troubled economy puts restraints on the budget on the high and low sides.  It will not 
allow a greater expenditure for defense in relation to other governmental programs, but it 
will also not allow the greater cutbacks that could be gained from downsizing due to the 
already high unemployment rate. 
The societal dimension of SSR has been steadily improving.  Under Tuđman, the 
secrecy of the security sector allowed for very little societal input into the policies.  The 
HDZ helped create veterans’ organizations that acted as apologists for Tuđman defense 
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 policies.  These organizations continue to play an important role in Croatian domestic 
politics toward security policies.  Democratization has brought about a greater role for 
civilian oversight, though there remains a dearth of civilian expertise in key ministries, 
the media, and non-governmental organizations. 
The international community has played an important role in helping shape SSR 
in Croatia.  Through the tools of defense assistance and conditionality, countries and 
organizations have been able to use a carrot and stick approach to bring about reform.  
The Croatian desire to be accepted in the international community, especially the 
organizations that represent Western Europe and political and economic progress (EU, 
NATO, and WTO) has prompted the government to implement changes desired by those 
countries and organizations.  The quest for reform becomes more problematic when 
dealing with the Croatian public.  Military downsizing and cooperation with the ICTY for 
high-profile figures are two issues that require a sensitive approach from outsiders.  The 
movement toward complete acceptance of the conditions may come slowly but the 
progress will be made by working with the key decision makers.   
Ultimately, the decisions to make fundamental reform must come from Croatia.  
The long-term approach to this reform must be based on creating the civilian expertise in 
society and the necessary capacity to maintain that expertise.  Establishing an education 
system that integrates security topics within civilian schools allowing the discussion of 
security sector reform to reach a much wider audience will create that expertise.  
Establishing incentives for people to get into these programs, once created, will do this as 
well. The creation of this cadre of experts and ensuring that they are put in positions to 
make use of their expertise will be the measure of success.  
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 V. CONCLUSION 
Croatia seeks to join the North Atlantic Alliance and other Euro-Atlantic 
structures.  Its candidacy is in keeping with the 1999 enlargement of the Washington 
Summit and the 2002 invitations at Prague Summit.  To understand the civil-military 
obstacles to Croatian membership in NATO, it is important to look at some of the 
historical factors:  the re-emergence of nationalism, the influence of paramilitaries, the 
politicization of the Croatian armed forces and its historical predecessors and the 
influence of the Homeland War. 
Tuđman used the military to legitimate his regime and the used the military as an 
extension of the executive branch and the dominant political party, the HDZ.  War 
brought military expertise to the soldiers but not to any of the political leaders who 
wished to provide any measure of democratic oversight. 
Croatia’s future lies in security sector reform as a comprehensive way to review 
the problems of the security sector and an understanding that without security, movement 
toward democracy and free market is greatly hampered.  Looking at security sector 
reform since Croatian independence, one can see a pattern form.  During the War Years, 
Tudjman created a security infrastructure that was solely responsible to him.  He used a 
multi-pronged approach to accomplish this.  He established extra-constitutional 
organizations to control the HV and avoid parliamentary oversight, and he politicized the 
military by penetrating it with HDZ members at all key positions.  He provided a 
patronage system that allows for party members to enrich themselves while working with 
the Ministries of Defense and Interior. 
The immediate nature of military build up and the need to fight the war did not 
allow for extensive education of leadership and a subsequent low level of military 
professionalism ensued.  Economic dimension of the security sector was deliberately 
hidden from any method of oversight.  This included a covert weapons procurement 
program, payment of party members and of paramilitaries.  Civil society played little role 
in the security sector except to provide the members of the army that was fighting. 
During Authoritarian consolidation the pattern was solidified, the HV and MUP 
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 were used to intimidate opponents and civil support for the HDZ was rallied by the 
creation of veterans’ organizations.  Tuđman created methods to work around the chain 
of command.  He ensured that military promotion and assignment was tied to party 
loyalty.  He further assured loyalty within the MoD through patronage. 
During the period of democratization, the new Croatian government understood 
that there existed a new strategic context within which the security sector must operate.  
This new strategic context deals with the threats of terrorism, organized crime and mass 
migration instead of the fear of external attack.  The first effort to deal with this new 
context was a campaign to de-politicize the security sector.  Concurrently, the 
government began to cooperate with the international community to support the ICTY.  It 
revised laws to provide proper oversight of the security sector.  They recognized the need 
to modernize and restructure the armed forces to come more into line with the standards 
established by NATO, but have been confronted with the economic issues that deal with 
restructuring.  Specifically, the disproportionate percentage of security budget tied to 
personnel that prevents the implementation of a modernization program.  The moral 
dilemma of cutting personnel addresses the responsibility the government has toward 
those who fought in the Homeland War against the need to downsize. 
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The international community has played a vital role through defense assistance 
and establishing conditions for membership.  IMET has been a highly successful 
American assistance program and the opportunities provided by NATO through PfP have 
greatly increased their exposure and understanding of the necessary reforms.  Croatia has 
shown great enthusiasm in being a part of these exercises and missions and has shown 
leadership in hosting them. Conditionality has been closely associated with the ICTY and 
Croatia’s compliance and cooperation with the tribunal.  The compliance has been mixed 
at best due to public opposition to jailing war heroes.  It has its limitations but when used 
narrowly, it can serve a valuable purpose.  The path ahead for Croatia is centered on the 
establishment of a cadre of civilian security sector experts, and the capacity to train 
further generations of such experts, who are then able provide democratic oversight of the 
military through work in the MoD, the Sabor, non-governmental organizations and the 
media.  Croatia has also sought membership in multi-lateral and regional organizations to 
fight corruption and crime throughout the Balkans.  The links between organized crime 
 and the security sector must be broken if Croatia is going to be able to take full control of 
its path toward membership. 
The political environment in which decisions of NATO membership are made 
will be the most important factor in a membership decision.  The United States remains 
the indispensable ally in the Alliance and, as such, wields the key vote on invitations to 
join the alliance for any new members.  The strategic context that NATO is now dealing 
in is one of a world where terrorism is the greatest threat and the Alliance is moving 
toward out-of-area missions that require an expeditionary force. The political context is 
that NATO members want to ensure that Croatia is following through in its promise to 
capture war criminals, and the United States is establishing bilateral treaties with states to 
prevent American personnel from being indicted by the International Criminal Court.  
The mixed record of turnover of indicted war criminals to the ICTY and the regional 
differences between Croatian prosecutions of the suspects brings suspicion from Europe 
as to Croatia’s willingness to follow this through.  The ICC is an issue of particular 
political importance for Washington in 2003.  Croatia has been conducting a balancing 
act, in trying to please the European Union, which opposes such bilateral treaties, and 
pleasing the United States.  The U.S. Congress established a law that prevents any 
military assistance from going to any country that does not sign the bilateral treaty 
concerning the ICC.  Croatia, despite its admirable work toward SSR, may make the 
political mistakes concerning the ICTY and the ICC and may lose the key sponsorship of 
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 VI. GLOSSARY 
ANP:  Annual National Plan 
BiH:  Bosnia-Hercegovina (Bosnia I Hercegovina) 
CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Association 
HDZ:  Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica) 
HOS:  Croat Defense Forces (Hrvatske Obrambene Snage) 
HV:  Croatian Armed Forces (Hrvatska Vojska) 
HVIDRA: Croatian Veterans Association 
HVO:  Croat Defense Council/Bosnian Croat Army (Hrvatska Vijece Odbrane) 
ICTY:  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IMET:  International Military Education and Training 
IPP:  Individual Partnership Program 
JNA:  Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija) 
MAP:  Membership Action Plan  
MPRI:  Military Professional Resources Incorporated 
MUP:  Ministry of Internal Affairs  
NAC:  North Atlantic Council 
NACC: North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDH:  Independent Croatian State (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska) 
OBS:  Anti-Yugoslav Intelligence 
OSHV:  Miiltary Intelligence and reconnaissance 
PARP:  Planning and Review Process 
PfP:  Partnership for Peace 
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 SFRY:  Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
SIS:  Defense Ministry Intelligence 
SONS:  National Security Committee  
SSR:  Security Sector Reform 
TO:  Territorial Defense Units (Teritorijalna Odbyana) 
UINS:  Interior Counter Intelligence 
VSO:  Strategic Decision Council  
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